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B u sin ess

The Potential Effects of Electric Utility Industry Deregulation on Montana Power
Company
Director: Dr. Clyde W Neu
For years, government officials and utility company management have struggled with
the challenge o f making electricity consumption in the United States more efficient
and less costly to the consumer. To this end, the Public Utility Reform Act o f 1978
attempted to introduce competition in the electric utility industry, but only succeeded
in rewarding the development o f uneconomic power sources. In 1996, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took another approach with the issuing of
Order No. 888, telling the nation’s utilities to open up their interstate transmission
systems to non-discriminate access. This launched the electric utility industry into the
world of competition, with expected savings between $3.5 and $5.4 billion per year
from increased utilization o f existing power plants and technological innovation. The
result — consumers across the nation will be able to choose their electricity supplier,
just as they can choose their long distance phone carrier.
Montana Power Company (MPC) has stepped into the arena of competition, in
response to Order No. 888. This decision to embrace deregulation will cause MPC to
change more dramatically than any previous action in the company’s history.
Critical issues facing MPC are: open competition for its customer base; geographic
remoteness to larger markets; cost o f production that is higher than market prices for
energy; continued difficulty in receiving equitable treatment from the Montana Public
Service Commission (MPSC) and a utility workforce that is unprepared for
competition.
MPC shows strength in several areas that are as equally important in a deregulated
environment: non-utility telecommunications, coal and oil & gas divisions that have
flourished in the competitive arena; strong financial performance; a recognizable
brand and the willingness o f management to make tough decisions that will ultimately
be the right decision for the shareholder.
One such decision MPC may face is merger with another utility. MPC was analyzed
for its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in relation to several utilities
considered potential merger candidates. This study reveals there is potential for
consolidation that would make sense for MPC, in light o f the changing world brought
on by deregulation.

Preface
In early 1996, the issuance o f Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order
No. 888 set utility deregulation in motion in the United States. FERC told the nation’s
public utilities to open their transmission lines to non-discriminatory competition,
signaling a historic change in the way electricity is sold. Electric utility deregulation is
expected to benefit the U.S. consumer and energy industry by billions o f dollars each
year, increasing utilization of existing generating facilities and lowering electric rates
throughout the nation.
This paper will evaluate the changes in the electric utility industry from the viewpoint
of Montana Power Company (MPC), an energy company with $2.8 billion in assets and
1997 revenues o f $1.023 billion. The evaluation o f the effect o f deregulation on MPC
will take part in three sections:
I.

First, an overview o f electric utility deregulation, including a discussion
on the stranded cost recovery issue and how MPC has chosen to deal
with the problems surrounding stranded costs. Also, the first section will
address deregulation o f the natural gas industry and the changing
relationship with State Public Service Commissions across the country.

II.

The second section discusses factors for succeeding in a deregulated
market, such as. cost and efficiency, transmission interties, employee
skills, new technologies, regulatory treatments, financial strength and the
ability to merge with or acquire other energy companies.

Ill

Finally, the third section of this paper will address various impacts of
deregulation on MPC and will summarize the results of this study. This
iii

section addresses the new world of competition and changes in the
Montana regulatory environment. A MPC company profile, along with a
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis is
provided.
Also included in this section is a financial analysis o f MFC and six
utilities determined to be competitors and/or potential merger candidates.
These utilities are: PacifiCorp, Puget Sound Energy, Idaho Power,
Washington Water Power (WWP), Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and
Edison International.
The hypothesis o f this study is that MPC will need to merge with another northwest
utility to effectively compete in the deregulated marketplace, because the market will
demand increased efficiency and utilization o f the former utility’s assets. In order to
become more efficient, those utilities with more generating capabilities than load (such
as MPC) will consolidate with utilities that have more demand than supply.
Shareholders and ratepayers will successfully demand the efficiencies o f the
marketplace, which will result in the market efficiency envisioned by the FERC when
Order No. 888 was issued.
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L Overview of Electric Utility Deregulation
On April 24, 1996, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chair Elizabeth A. Moler
ordered the nation's public electric utilities to open their transmission lines to
competitors, with the goal of expanding the wholesale electricity arena and ultimately
lowering electricity prices for all consumers in the country. According to Chairwoman
Moler, “Today’s actions by the Commission will benefit the industry and consumers to
the tune o f billions of dollars every year. They will give us an electric industry ready to
enter the 21st century. These rules will accelerate competition and bring lower prices
and more choice to energy customers.” She also stated, “The future is here — and the
future is competition. It is a global trend, and in North America, we are at the forefront
in embracing it. There is no turning back.” ^
The catalyst to embrace competition came via FERC Order No. 888—the final rule on
transmission open access.^ It requires public utilities owning, controlling, or operating
transmission lines to file nondiscriminatory open access tariffs that offer others the
same transmission service the company provides itself. The theory is this type of access
to wholesale power will bring lower costs to electric consumers, ensure continued
reliability of the electric power industry, and provide open and fair electric transmission
services by public utilities. According to Chairwoman Moler, the cost savings expected
from these actions are estimated between $3.8 and $5.4 billion per year in the United
States.* It is anticipated the cost savings will arise fi’om increased utilization o f existing
power plants and from technological innovations that will lead to new, more efficient
power production nationwide.
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Under FERC Order No. 888, all public utilities that own, control, or operate interstate
transmission facilities are required to offer service to others under a pro forma tariff
issued by FERC. FERC established the tariff as a guideline for minimum terms and
conditions o f service expected. These tariffs also must be used by the issuing utility for
its own wholesale energy sales and purchases. Since Montana Power Company (MPC)
owns transmission facilities, as well as generation and distribution, the utility falls under
the direction of FERC Order No. 888 for its wholesale transactions.
Embracing this new direction is MPC Vice-Chairman o f the Board and President Bob
Gannon. According to Gannon, ‘'Economic history and theory instruct that competitive
markets outperform regulated markets where no natural monopoly or (risk of) market
failure exists. The introduction of competition in the telecommunications, trucking, gas,
and stock brokerage industries demonstrates that competition can provide benefits that
regulation cannot. In competitive markets, these benefits reward those who are most
efficient and punish those who are least efficient.’*^ Gannon proposes to first move MPC
to competition in the wholesale power market (i.e. large, bulk buyers of electricity, such
as municipalities, large manufacturing plants, etc.), then offer full choice to
retail/residential customers over the next 4 years. Under this plan, MPC’s generation
assets would immediately become unregulated and the company would cease to be
vertically integrated. When this happens, arms-length, cost-based agreements would be
structured between the unregulated generation (supply) division and the regulated
(energy services) division. This would allow the production arm of the company the
flexibility to compete in the open market for MPC’s large industrial loads, the first of
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MFC’s customer base able to seek a new energy supplier. These are the customers
being courted by other energy suppliers, such as neighboring Northwest utilities and
stand alone independent power producers who now will be given access to such
customers. Likewise, the production arm also will be able to look for potential new
customers in other service territories previously untouchable.
At the same time, the majority of MFC ’s 270,000 residential and small retail customers
would continue to see cost-based rates, regulated by the Montana Fublic Service
Commission (MFSC), for the next 4 years. This action protects approximately $375
million o f the $452 million annual revenue stream o f the company see Exhibit 1 (FRC08, pg. 2, Column B). The other key point of MFC’s plan addresses the need for a 5year transition period, where “stranded costs” would be recovered from the customer
base. MFC’s proposal anticipates the transition period would start six months after a
final MFSC order on restructuring in Montana.
While it was initially the company’s intent to seek recovery of its stranded generating
costs over a 5-year transition period, discussion at the end of the next section will reveal
a change of course for MFC. It is informative to discuss the stranded cost issue from
MFC’s viewpoint, prior to its decision to go a new direction.
Stranded Costs
Besides opening up the nation’s electric utilities to deregulation. Order No. 888 also
provides for the full recovery o f stranded costs—that is, costs that were prudently
incurred to serve wholesale power customers and that could go unrecovered if these
customers use open access to move to another supplier. FERC will permit a public
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Utility to seek recovery o f wholesale stranded costs from departing customers via direct
assignment of the stranded costs created by each customer’s departure. The costs must
be verifiable, prudently incurred, and there must have been a reasonable expectation of
continuation of electric service on the part of the utility. FERC Order No. 888’s
stranded cost recovery clause for wholesale power contracts states that recovery is
possible only on contracts signed before July 11, 1994. After that date, recovery must
by specifically provided for in the contract.
Stranded costs can be incurred in one o f two ways:
1. Investment in generating assets with a cost to generate electricity that is outof-market. Out-of-market costs are defined as those costs incurred by a utility in
a regulated environment, where cost recovery was in essence guaranteed as part
o f the utility franchise, that are now greater than what the market will pay for
similar services in a competitive environment. Out-of-market costs for Montana
Power are illustrated by Exhibit 2 (RJL-1, Net Hydro & Thermal Out-of-Market
Cost)." Under the old regulation, MPC’s ratepayers would have been asked to
pay for approximately $58 million more in 1998 generating costs than they
would reasonable expect to pay under deregulation.
2. Wholesale power contracts entered into by the utility, normally qualifying
facility (QF) contracts that are out-of-market. Qualifying facilities were
established through the Public Utility Reform Act of 1978, as an attempt to
introduce competition in the electric utility industry. Public utilities were
required to purchase all the generation from QFs that chose to locate within the
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service territory o f the utility. QF generation was sold into the utility
transmission grid at the cost o f the QF s production, plus a profit. In almost all
instances, the QF cost was much higher than the utility’s generation cost. An
example o f the effects o f QFs can be seen by reviewing MPC’s power supply
costs (and their respective delivered KWh’s). There are three major components
to the company’s generation base:
% o f Costs

% o f KWh delivered

1. Hydro Facilities

28%

37%

2. QF Contracts

23%

9%

3. Thermal Facilities 49%

54%

Note the effect QFs have on both the cost structure and actual energy supply o f the
company. This discussion will avoid a lengthy analysis on the previous legislative
wisdom o f forcing utilities nationwide to purchase power from uneconomic QFs. The
percentages above speak to the effect QFs have had on MFC and its ratepayers. Over
$26 million/year has been paid to QFs in the state of Montana. Without an economic
incentive to be efficient, QF s have been a detriment to the development of efficient
energy in the United States.
The main focus of MPC’s Electric Restructuring Informational Filing (Docket No.
96.12.206) and the follow-up Electric Restructuring Transition Plan Filing (Docket
D97.7.90), is to assign the existing power supply cost-of-service, that would otherwise
be stranded, to the various customer classes. This is a defensive strategy that will collect
the company’s embedded power supply cost fi’om existing customers through normal
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billing and also from customers wishing to exit MPC’s system anytime during the four
year transition period. An exit fee, based on stranded costs, would be imposed prior to
early departure.
The existing generation and transmission assets would be removed from the regulated
ratebase and the return on, and return of, these assets through a cost-of-service
calculation would be replaced with a cost-based supply contract between the
unregulated

Energy

Supply

Division

and

the

regulated

Energy

Services/Telecommunications Division of Montana Power Company. The term of the
contract would coincide with the proposed transition period and would eliminate the
company’s stranded costs concerns by the end of the four-year transition period.
Exhibit 2, Net Hydro & Thermal Out-of-Market Cost, taken from Mr. John Leland’s
testimony in the Electric Restructuring Transition Plan Filing, shows graphically the
potential hydro and thermal stranded costs if market prices are assumed at a medium
market price for delivered power on MPC’s system. Mr. Leland is the manager of the
Electric Resource Planning and Economic Analysis Department at MPC. As such, his
responsibilities include determining MPC customers’ future electric resource needs,
within the guidelines established by the MPSC. According to Mr Leland’s graph,
approximately 1/3 o f MPC ’s power supply cost is out-of-market and therefore would be
considered stranded cost if MPC’s system opened up to full competition today.
While in the transition period, this structure will make little difference to the typical
MPC residential customer, because residential utility rates still will be based on a power
supply contract with a cost-of-service basis, not market prices.

7

The purpose o f such a relatively long transition period is to allow for the recovery of
stranded costs and give the company some form o f protection until a fiill organizational
restructuring o f the company can be accomplished. To allow existing MPC customers a
choice (albeit an expensive one that effectively eliminates true market choice), MPC
proposes a “market access rate” to cover stranded costs and accommodate customers
who can and want to enter the competitive marketplace. The direct market access rate
would have several components.
•

A transition charge based on hydro and thermal out-of-market costs during
the transition period.

•

A transition charge based on purchase power (QF) contracts out-of-market
during the transition period.

•

A transition charge to collect approximately $12.9 million annually on
regulatory assets of $258.2 million.^ Regulatory assets are deferred
accounting costs that have value because o f prior regulatory treatment.
These costs were not previously collected in rates at the time the service was
provided and include such items as conservation resource acquisition,
deferred income taxes, and employee benefits/compensation.

•

A Universal Systems Benefit Charge (USBC) to cover the cost of energy
conservation/demand-side management,

low-income energy

assistance

programs, development of renewable energy sources, and other research and
development costs. The logic behind the USBC is to insure all users pay for
certain investments that benefit society as a whole. The belief is a
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competitive marketplace would not otherwise provide a revenue pool for
such investments. The USBC charge would be non-bypassable, meaning it
would be a fixed charge paid by everyone on the system.
Mr Leland provides extensive testimony on the company’s calculations to determine
stranded costs for both existing thermal and hydro facilities and wholesale power
contracts (see Exhibit 3- Graph 11). The proposed stranded cost recovery rate (shown as
the right-downward slanting lines in the transition period) assumes the medium market
price. The “wedge” represents the dollar risk to MPC shareholders if the market price
falls below the medium forecast. The amount of the wedge from July 1998 to July 2002
is present-valued at approximately $59 million. Looking from 2002 to 2013, MFC is
still at considerable risk, until the medium forecast exceeds the hydro and thermal costs.
The total present value dollars at risk during this period are $346 million. This risk goes
up to $625 million if the low market price forecast proves accurate.
These risks undoubtedly weighed heavily in Bob Gannon’s December 9, 1997
announcement of the company’s intent to sell MFC’s coal-fired and hydroelectric
plants. In comments at the annual shareholders meeting in May 1998, Gannon said,
“The decision was made because:
•

Many o f the utilities involved in industry-restructuring and customer choice were
involved in processes to sell their generation to resolve state stranded-cost issues

•

As Montana Power looked at the prices being paid for generation, questions were
raised about what our assets might bring, and whether we would have stranded
costs.
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•

And the risk-reward nature o f the generation business was, and still is, dramatically
changing —with increasing risk being part o f the equation.”

“We also had been testing the forward market for electric power supplies,” Gannon
said. “We found two things: Price volatility, and low prices. Over the next four to five
years, the prices for electricity were coming out at less than our costs of production. We
saw that situation as very challenging — the prospect o f incurring tens of millions o f
dollars of losses for several years, while waiting for the market to turn. As a small
player in this consolidating generation market, we believed that it would be too risky in
the future for us to stay in this business, and that now is the time to exit.”^
This decision has eliminated a lengthy debate with the MPSC and Montana Consumer
Council (MCC) over stranded costs and has moved MPC away from a defensive
strategic approach to deregulation. However, there will still be opposite views on how
much of the sale proceeds will be returned to the ratepayers.
California —The Bellwether State for Deregulation
The path MPC is currently able to pursue has come about in great measure due to the
efforts of not only FERC, but the utilities and the California Public Utility Commission
in California. Since 1992, the CPUC has been working toward full retail open access.
The state began its efforts to deregulate after the passage of the Federal Energy Policy
Act o f 1992, which was intended to introduce greater market competition to the energy
industry, thereby improving efficiency and reducing rates to customers. On September
24, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson signed into law legislation that would open the state’s
electricity market to competition over the next 5 years. However, the timetable was
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changed to move California to fiill (unrestricted) open access effective January 1, 1998.
The law put to an end the practice of a single utility providing all electric service within
its service territory, introducing choice and competition to end users, i.e. the retail
customers.
California has developed a framework for competition with the establishment of an
independent power pool known as the Western Electric Power Exchange (WEPEX).
The function of the WEPEX is to:
•

Establish a preferred schedule of generation (supply) offers and demand bids

•

Administer transparent and nondiscriminatory bidding protocols

•

Establish necessary information links to Independent System Operator (ISO)
and market participants

During the original five-year transition period, which is still intact, all generators of
electricity (both in state and out-of-state) will sell their power into the WEPEX and
transmit power across a statewide ISO transmission grid. All power will be sold into the
Exchange until a viable market value has been established for the state’s generating
assets. Neither the WEPEX or ISO will have financial interest in any source of
generation or transmission facilities. The WEPEX will work to match generation
(supply) sold into WEPEX with demand bids from utilities, power marketers, and
others, ranking generation supply on a least-cost basis. It will serve as a clearinghouse
by providing an auction point for hourly or half-hourly price signals aimed at immediate
users and long-term investors. The Exchange also determines a preferred schedule of
delivery o f power to the ISO and serves as load procurer for those California customers
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not represented by brokers or marketers. The goal o f the WEPEX is to establish a
visible spot market, open to all suppliers, both in-state and regionally through the
Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC). However, as explained later,
California’s current transmission pricing does penalize those desiring to enter the
WEPEX from outside the state. The WEPEX, WSCC, along with MPC’s proposed
transmission structure, is discussed in greater detail in the Transmission Intertie section.
Purpose and Result of Deregulation in Natural Gas Transmission
What MPC and the California utilities are pursuing, to enact non-discriminatory open
access in the electric industry, has roots in the opening of the nation’s natural gas
transmission lines in the late 1980’s. In the landmark 1988 court case, Associated Gas
Distributors (AGD) vs. FERC, the issue revolved around whether FERC had the
authority to order industry-wide non-discriminatory open access as a remedy to undue
discrimination in interstate natural gas transmission services.^ Opponents contended that
FERC did not have the authority to force a gas transmission company to be a “common
carrier” of natural gas for other gas suppliers, as a condition o f receiving authorization
to transport its own gas across interstate lines.
The Washington D C Circuit court affirmed, in fact considered it a responsibility o f the
FERC, to order the filing of non-discriminatory open access transmission tariffs by any
company wanting to transport gas across interstate lines. This was done as a remedy for
undue discrimination or anti-competitive behavior. The court found that in most
situations, discrimination that precludes transmission access or gives inferior access will
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have at least potential anti-competitive effects, because it limits access to markets and
therefore limits competition.
Similarly, it is probable that any transmission provision that has anti-competitive effects
also would be found to be unduly discriminatory or preferential because the anti
competitive provision would most likely favor the trcinsmission owner over others. The
FERC enforces this ruling by denying certification (and therefore permission to
transport interstate natural gas) to any company that does not file non-discriminatory
open access tariffs with the FERC.
Today's natural gas industry looks quite different than it did in 1978. Natural gas
producers are unregulated (except for safety and environmental restrictions), there are a
large number of producers (as well as aggregators, brokers, marketers, and others) that
compete aggressively to sell commodities. By most indications, performance in the
natural gas industry has improved dramatically.
This competition has lowered natural gas prices considerably. According to Kenneth W.
Costello and Daniel J. Duann, in their 1996 article. Turning up the Heat in the Natural
Gas Industrv,^ “from 1984 to 1993 wellhead price declined by 24 percent. Natural gas
prices have fallen from their mid-1980s levels to the point where retail gas consumers
cumulatively saved as much as $100 billion. During the period 1984 to 1993 the
average retail price of natural gas declined by 16 percent.
The pipeline and distribution sectors have experienced significant improvements in
productivity as well. During the period 1984 to 1993, for example, labor productivity in
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these sectors improved by 24 percent, and operation and maintenance expenses per unit
declined by 18 percent.”
One conspicuous outcome since the mid-1980s has been the decline in the retail price of
gas for large customers relative to small customers (for example, residential and certain
commercial customers). Wellhead gas prices have decreased more during non-winter
periods, which disproportionately benefits customers with high load factors (e.g.,
industrial customers), and the prices of transmission and distribution services have
fallen more for large customers, such as industrial and electric utility customers. During
the period 1984 to 1993, for example, residential customers benefited from a 12 percent
decline in the real price of transmission and distribution services, while industrial and
electric utilities enjoyed 63 percent and 55 percent declines, respectively.
Whether the movement of gas rates in this direction reflects an undesirable outcome is
debatable. It may simply reflect gas service providers’ price discrimination in favor of
price-elastic customers. With more competition and regulatory flexibility, providers
would be expected to have a greater inclination and ability to price on the basis o f
market conditions. With large customers having more market choices, it is not
surprising that they were able to enjoy larger rate declines. Costello and Duann go on to
say, “Overall, the pattern o f gas rates has probably improved economic efficiency: it
reflects the pressures placed by market forces to reduce the size of cross-subsidies. As
o f 10 years ago, large customers were subsidizing other customers. The changed pattern
o f retail rates since that time represents a movement toward cost-based rates. The
general impression of industry observers is that industrial customers were subsidizing
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Other customers. Unlike the cases of the telecommunications and electric power
industries, there has been little formal study of this issue.”^
In any event, there is a legitimate concern that small retail customers, relative to other
gas customers, may have received too few o f the benefits fi"om the recent reforms in the
natural gas industry. One can argue that this phenomenon is the typical pattern in public
utility industries encountering major restructuring—large customers receive most o f the
benefits during the initial years, while a broader group o f customers has to wait longer
The dispersion of benefits across all gas customer groups will necessitate a more
broadly competitive retail gas market than what currently exists.
In summary, affirming that FERC had the authority to force natural gas companies to
open access to their (pipeline) transmission systems helped set the stage for today’s
opening of the nation’s electric transmission systems.
New Relationship with State Public Service Commissions

Change in Scope and Purpose
Traditionally, the federal government concerned itself with regulating the wholesale
power market, leaving the regulation of retail power (sale to the ultimate customer) and
the energy companies within the state up to the state public service commission.
Regulation o f retail power within the state included such things as insuring adequate,
reliable electric service to all customers at the lowest total cost. Also, state PSC’s were
charged with the oversight o f the planning, construction and operation of the generation,
transmission and distribution systems within the state.
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Sorting out which regulatory body will have authority in the future, FERC or the State
PSC, is a complex issue. If the goal of FERC Order No. 888 is eventual universal access
for all 115-million retail electric customers in the U.S., then the federal government
must step into the State’s jurisdiction to insure all customers have choice. This causes
many state PSC’s some concern. Such issues as jurisdiction over the siting of major
generation and transmission facilities, fairness to the state’s retail customers and the
historical retail customer funding o f soon-to-be deregulated generating assets are all
questions needing to be answered by those structuring the new competitive
environment.
In Montana, the MPSC has a great deal of power over utility companies in the state and
therefore is understandably concerned over the potential erosion o f authority when two
of the three major components of MPC (generation and transmission) will fall outside
MPSC jurisdiction. This will leave only MPC’s distribution fimction under MPSC
control. Generation and transmission will fall under FERC jurisdiction.
For many years the relationship between the MPSC and businesses in the state (both
utilities and large utility customers) has been strained. The MPSC is considered by
many to be one of the most hostile PSCs in the country. This distinction may come from
the fact that the MPSC is an elected body and therefore responds to the consumer class
with the greatest vote: residential customers. The successful election battlecry for the
politician seeking a term with the MPSC is to promise low residential rates, high rates
for “big business” and stiff opposition to any utility company rate filings. While
insuring a contented voting constituency, the effect o f these political actions has
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allowed a cross-subsidy o f the residential class that has set up a scenario for other
energy sellers now coming into the market to “cherry pick” MPC’s largest customers
(see Impact of Deregulation on MFC—The New World of Competition).
The implementation o f FERC Order No. 888 sets the stage for this to be played out, as
the following scenario suggests. As the cherry picking occurs, the larger customers will
exit MPC’s system, leaving the smaller customer classes (residential, small businesses,
etc ) to absorb remaining fixed costs. Along with the exodus o f the larger customers,
residential rates will skyrocket and MPC will become financially unhealthy and
increasingly vulnerable to takeover.

Change o f Jurisdiction
Drawing the jurisdictional line between FERC and the state regulatory authority
becomes an important step in establishing a new working model for open access. This is
true not so much for wholesale transactions, because they naturally occur at the higher
voltage transmission level and therefore fall under FERC jurisdiction, but for retail
transactions that will occur more and more often as the nation opens up to full access
for all customers.
In instances o f unbundled retail energy delivery, where a low voltage user seeks its own
power supply, FERC will defer to recommendations by the state regulatory body as to
where the jurisdictional bounty should be drawn, as long as the boundaries follow
FERC’s 7-point guideline on the critical question: Where does transmission service end
and distribution service begin?
FERC Order No. 888 establishes the seven indicators:^
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1. Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail customers
2. Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character
3. Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever, flows out
4. When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or
transported on to some other market
5. Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively
restricted geographic area
6. Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure
flows into the local distribution system
7. Local distribution systems will be reduced voltage
FERC states its intent is to keep state regulatory authority intact, with the state
continuing to have authority over local distribution, historical state franchise areas, and
state laws governing retail marketing areas o f electric utilities. Although disputed by
several state regulators in a Fitch research article (see “Ability to stay the same, merge
with or acquire other energy companies” section, concerns of Susan F Clark, Florida
PSC Chairwomen),

FERC explicitly states in Order No 888 that it will not affect or

encroach upon state authority in such traditional areas as: the authority over local
service issues, including reliability of local service; administration o f integrated
resources planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions; authority over utility
resource portfolios; generation transmission siting; and authority to impose nonbypassable distribution and retail stranded cost charges.

18

In Montana, it remains to be seen how the authority o f the MPSC will be effected by
FERC s new direction with transmission. Since utility customers will no longer be
looked upon to pay cost-based rates for generation (while transmission will still be
primarily cost-based), the MPSC role will be reduced to looking at whether MPC
purchased power (either from itself or others) at an appropriate market price. This will
occur instead o f scrutinizing every new generation construction or maintenance project
the company plans. In the future, if MPC chooses to invest in the reconstruction or
upgrade of a dam, the costs of such a project will need to be justified on the value of
that resource in the marketplace, not on whether the MPSC will allow the cost of the
project into rates. Undoubtedly, MPC will be responding more to FERC than the MPSC
on the daily operations of its transmission facilities, leaving the MPSC with oversight of
only those items listed above and the daily operations of the distribution function.

n. Factors for MPC Succeeding in a Deregulated Market
Cost and Efficiency
Helping establish a framework for MPC to implement FERC Order No. 888 is Dr.
James Falvey, Director of Allocated Costs for Montana Power Company. In prefiled
testimony before the MPSC,*^ Dr. Falvey explains that to implement the FERC
directive, utility costs must be “unbundled” and assigned to customer classes based on
cost causation, either embedded or (preferably) marginal cost causation. This is a step
MFC and the MPSC have been unwilling to take until now, presumably because o f the
political power of the residential (voting) customers, who traditionally have enjoyed
utility rates lower than the actual cost to serve.
As previously mentioned, traditional MPC rate filings with the MPSC have skewed cost
signals to MFC’s customer classes, typically with residential customers being
subsidized by large industrial customers. Rate cases are based on average cost o f a pre
determined annual test period, which is “normalized” to remove non-typical costs. Dr.
Falvey points out there are two problems with such an approach:
1. The cost signal sent to the consumer is based on an averaging of past fixed and
incremental costs, not the real cost to serve at a given point in time. According to
Falvey, “If cost assignments are not reflective o f cost causation, some customers
may be consuming (not be consuming) services that are not worth (are worth more
than) the costs those services cause. To the extent that the charge is more reflective
of cost causation, efficiency improvements will result on an overall societal basis”.
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Going further with the cost causation concept leads to marginal pricing, where
energy is appropriately priced at the marginal cost of the next kilowatt of power in
the trading area or market. The most efficient producer will sell power first at the
lowest price (until all the energy from that producer is used up); the marginal cost of
the second most efficient producer will establish the price for the next power
purchaser, and so on until all energy needs are met. The discussion on how the
buying and selling of power under this concept will be accomplished was included
in the section “California—The Bellwether State for Deregulation.”
2. MPC spends incredible time capturing information to determine the embedded cost
causation of each customer class, ultimately determining an appropriate basis for
allocation of the company’s cost for each customer class. This work is effectively
undone by a final step - rate design. Rate design is developed by staff at MFC and is
the third of three steps performed to develop a rate filing.
After determining the cost of service from the accounting records of the company
(step 1) the company then segregates these costs into customer classes based on cost
causation (step 2). Rate design (step 3) takes the allocated costs of each customer
class and reshuffles them, assigning more costs to be recovered from some classes
(usually industrial customers) and relieving other classes by the same amount
(usually residential customers). Rate design doesn’t effect the total dollars requested
in the rate filing, just the assignment of cost recovery from the various customer
classes. The motive for the rate design step is generally political. In effect, what was
attempted in the cost allocation determination step is undone by the rate design.
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Straightening out this cross-subsidization will allow consumers to make their buying
decisions based correct economic signals, unskewed by traditional rate design Society
as a whole will benefit by such a structure because consumers will no longer receive
inappropriate cost signals; producers will be forced to become more efficient in order to
survive; and resources will be allocated in a way that makes economic sense. The result:
customer choice for energy consumption linked to energy production will be available
for the first time, bringing about the competition and efficiency envisioned by FERC
Chairwoman Moler. Customers will have the opportunity to select their supplier and
determine supply cost allocations for themselves. No longer will there be endless MPSC
hearings and contentious debates over the allocation and rate recovery o f production
costs. For the first time, politics will take a back seat to efficient consumption of
electricity in the state o f Montana.
A costless side benefit o f MFC’s restructuring for open access will be the barriers put in
place that will stop cross-subsidization within the company in the future. MFC’s intent
is to abandon a vertically-integrated organizational structure. When it does, cross
subsidization, caused by past rate designing that hid costs from some rate classes while
overcharging others, will be virtually impossible, because under the new corporate
structure, discussed more fully in the Company Profile section, the company will be
operationally unbundled, with an unregulated supply and transmission arm and a
regulated distribution arm.
Transmission Interties
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MFC’s success in the new marketplace depends not only on the ability to compete in a
deregulated generation market, but also on the ability to address transmission intertie
issues. Transmission interties refer to the physical link(s) between two or more
transmission systems. Combining all o f the transmission systems together that have
interties make up the transmission grid for that region. There are three major
transmission grids in the country, which will be discussed in more detail later. MFC is
linked primarily to the WSCC transmission grid. As Exhibit 4 indicates, MFC is linked
to the major western U.S. markets via a 500 KV line running from Colstrip to Garrison,
Montana, leaving the state at Taft. According to an analysis of the California
competitive energy markets, completed by LCG Consulting for the California Energy
Commission, MFC provides two generation injection points for the WSCC, one at
Garrison (listed as Anaconda on the map) and another at Taft.^^
MFC also has access to the Midwestern markets, though with significantly less
capacity, through a 230-270 KV line that converts with an AC-DC-AC tie at Miles City.
This line has approximately 200 MW o f capacity, which is fully subscribed by the
Western Area Fower Association (WAFA). According to Bill Fascoe, Vice-Fresident o f
Transmission Services for MFC, to boost the capability of sending power to the
Midwest, approximately 90 miles of transmission facilities would have to be
constructed (from Colstrip to Miles City) and significant infrastructure would have to be
built on both sides of the intertie.

It’s most likely this connection will not be pursued

at this time, because of cost constraints. This effectively means MFC will compete only
in the WSCC, limiting the opportunities to compete in the Midwest market.
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Market reach to the West becomes a key transmission intertie question for MPC.
Addressing the distance to substantial markets and what type of penalty MFC would be
subjected to in order to serve such markets becomes a critical point to competing
outside Montana. Right now, MFC is effectively blocked from incrementally priced
competition outside of a close geographic proximity to Montana because of what is
known as "pancaked transmission pricing.” While selling MFC’s generating assets will
somewhat relieve the issues surrounding moving power outside of the state, it does not
completely eliminate the company’s concerns. If pancaked pricing is not eliminated, the
sale value of MFC’s generating assets will be harmed. Also, assuming MFC will
continue to be active in energy trading, the elimination of pancaking will be just as
important to the company as it is to MFC’s competitors.
An example of pancaked transmission pricing is the current prices MFC has to pay to
deliver power to California, through the only viable system - the BFA transmission
network. Under FERC Order No. 888, MFC must charge itself for transmission access
from Colstrip to the BFA interchange at Garrison, Montana (3 mills, for example), then
pay BFA 2 mills to transport from Garrison to a second interchange on the BFA system,
where another 4 mills is charged. Finally, the California system, WEFEX, has put in
place an access charge to come into the California market. This charge is approximately
4 mills. These transmission charges total up to 13 mills on a system where BFA sells
generation incrementally at 3 mills during high run-off years. Some would argue the tail
is wagging the dog under such a structure.
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To further the argument against pancaking and help explain how electricity actually
flows through a transmission grid. Jack Berlier, Jr. offers the analogy, ‘Ticture the
(transmission) grid as a lake All around the lake are customers, drawing out water
according to their needs. At various points around the same lake are suppliers who add
water to the lake to keep the level of the lake constant and to maintain supply for
consumers. When a consumer and supplier agree to buy and sell water, water is added
to the lake at one end by the supplier and drawn out at the other end by the consumer.
Berlier goes on to say, “Suppose several water suppliers happen to hold title to
‘portions’ of the lake basin. If the current electric transmission pricing practices were
applied to our Make’ analogy, these lake basin owners would keep track of each water
transaction and charge a fee for passage o f water molecules over their portion o f the
lake. Whenever water was added by a supplier to satisfy the withdrawal by a consumer,
the lake basin owners would consult a map o f the lake and draw lines between the
supplier and the consumer. Any lines that happen to ‘cross’ their parcel of the lake basin
would signal a right to charge a ‘transportation’ fee. Lines would overlap from multiple
water transactions, causing disputes among property owners about which lines the
various transactions actually followed. In reality, of course, the water drawn from one
end o f the lake contained none o f the molecules added at the other end.” Finally, Berlier
states, “A much more equitable solution would be to charge a single price for use of the
lake basin based on the customer’s volume, which would be distributed among the
owners o f the lake based on acreage and maintenance c o s t s . T h i s scenario would
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establish a broad market base for utilities to compete based on an underlying point of
deregulation: market-driven pricing for generation.
Nationally, according to Berlier, “The development of large markets provides the best
possible assurance that no single entity, either seller or buyer, can wield market power
over other participants.” Ideally, to establish an open market, there would be three
regions in the U.S., defined by the boundaries o f the Eastern, Western and Texas
ERCOT interconnections. This Western region is known as the WSCC, which was
defined earlier as the Western System Coordinating Council The most significant
market in the WSCC is California, followed by the growing Northwest market. The
WSCC links regional resources through an extensive network of transmission lines that
represent a complex regional system as shown in Exhibit 4. The region encompasses an
area of nearly 1.8 million square miles o f a highly interconnected transmission network
spanning across the western United States from the Canadian to Mexican borders,
encompassing the fourteen western states.
Under Berber's scenario, MPC would participate in this region and would be able to
offer any customer in the region the same transmission rate, regardless of location and
number o f transmission systems crossed to get from the generation source to the
customer. One way to insure each transmission owner would be compensated for the
cost of repair and maintenance on their portion of the system would be to have the
independent system operator (ISO) collect the transmission fees from all users o f the
system. The ISO could then pay the transmission owners based on their ratio of the
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system’s long-run marginal cost to that of the long-run marginal cost for all o f the assets
under control o f the ISO.
However, the current situation does not allow MPC open access to all markets and does
not offer a regional transmission rate. For example, MPC currently sells into Los
Angeles from the non-regulated Colstrip 4 unit. Half o f the generation from Colstrip 4
is under long-term contract to the city o f Los Angeles, with a transmission charge of
approximately 13 mills. The other half is sold to Puget Sound Power and Light in the
Seattle area, with a transmission charge of approximately 7 mills. The 6 mill difference
is due to BP A s practices o f internal pancaking of transmission rates. For example, if an
energy supplier (MPC) wants to sell to Seattle, one rate applies for the Garrison to
Seattle leg, usually 2 mills. If MPC wants to sell to California, the Garrison to Seattle
leg now costs 4 mills, plus the additional 4 mill charge to gain access from WEPEX at
the California border. This action undoubtedly violates the spirit of FERC Order No.
888. It would surprise few in the Northwest electric market if FERC took a stand
against the internal pancaking of BP A transmission rates and the WEPEX '^border
charge” into California.
While a 3-region concept would facilitate the ability to compete in a very large
geographic area, it is not the path recommended by William Pascoe, MPC’s Vice
President of Transmission, nor the path the other utilities in the West seem to be going
down. While a 3-region open market may be an ultimate goal for open access in the
U.S., it would be very unwieldy to develop all at once. According to Mr Pascoe, such a
system needs to be introduced in a smaller scale, such as the one proposed by MPC.
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The MPC proposed system begins with the development of a regional grid. In pre-filed
testimony for the Restructuring Informational Filing with the MPSC, Mr Pascoe
indicates MPC supports the formation o f a smaller scale regional independent grid
operator known as IndeGO. IndeGO would control and operate 22,000 miles o f high
voltage transmission lines in an eight state area and would offer one rate across the
system, effectively eliminating pancaked transmission rates within the region. The eight
state region includes: Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Oregon
and northern Nevada. There are 9 investor owned utilities, 10 public utilities and two
government agencies - BP A and WAP A, within IndeGO. There will be eleven pricing
zones, which will vary the transmission charge based primarily on load density. A
customer in Montana, where there is less load, may pay 4 mills for transmission service
vs. a customer in Seattle who will get a 2 mill rate. Pricing based on load density
recognizes that the cost o f transmission service is primarily fixed, not variable, and
therefore appropriately adjusted upward for lower load areas, such as Montana. The
most disturbing comment by Mr Pascoe came when he estimated it would take up to
two and a half years to get IndeGO operational, meaning MPC will not be relieved o f
the burden o f pancaked pricing anytime in the near future.
IndeGO s partners in the West will be two other systems, the previously mentioned
California system (WEPEX) and Desert Star, which is just now forming. Desert Star
includes the Arizona, New Mexico and southern Nevada markets.
While not as far-reaching as Berlier’s concept or the California analysis completed by
LCG Consulting, the IndeGO plan effectively opens up a

pgional area to real
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competition and is consistent with the intent of FERC Order No. 889 in that
transmission regions would be governed by ISOs, insuring open, non-discriminatory
transmission service under a FERC tariff. In addition, Pascoe believes that IndeGO will
improve reliability o f delivery service both within each company and regionally,
through the synergies created by being part o f a regional transmission system.

Pascoe

also mentions that the separation of transmission and wholesale power purchase
functions will help eliminate the split focus o f the former transmission employee.
Previously, a transmission employee had responsibility for both wholesale power
transactions as well as the operation of the transmission system. The attention required
to execute wholesale power purchases typically would draw the employee away from
his or her system operational responsibilities.
Finally, the ability o f competitors to come into MPC’s market territory and be able to
sell in an economically rational manner will assure MPC’s customers of competitively
priced generation. However, if transmission pancaking continues, these same MPC
customers would be unable to receive competitively priced electricity from outside the
state.
Employee Skills
Deregulation will not only require efficient production of electricity and transmission
pricing that will truly establish a broad market base in which to compete; it will require
a fundamental change in the required skills o f company employees and management.
In the past, MPC employee and management ability focused primarily on two
disciplines: engineering and accounting. The engineers built the regulated assets and the
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accountants kept track o f the costs to be reported to the MPSC. High employee
performance within the utility industry use to mean insuring the lights came on reliably,
customer calls were answered promptly (something that can be used for brand equity if
in fact the company is “good” to its customers), shareholders received a fair and stable
rate o f return on their investment, and the company was run in an acceptable manner
according to the state public service commission. Targeted improvements for the next
year were typically based on some improvement relative to current standard, such as a
10% reduction in O&M costs. Employees wrote the justification for capital projects
with little emphasis on economics or business reasoning, instead focusing on insuring a
reliable and redundant (safe) system. There was little thought given to competitors
outside the system, other than to estimate how much off-system sales might be possible
in the coming year, with a goal o f buffering the regulatory requirement needed from
traditional ratepayers. These were the traits of effective employees and management.
But for the competitive future, whether the utility adopts an offensive or defensive
strategy, a new set o f performance standards will be required. Emerging non-regulated
competitors, unencumbered by the entitlement culture and the comparatively limited
marketing and business skills o f today’s utility company workforce, will redefine the
employee traits o f a successful energy company.
According to an article entitled “Building a Winning Electric Utility Organization,”
written by Farha, Keough and Silverman, “Tomorrow’s successful energy company
employee will have superior marketing, risk management, product development, and
alliance management skills, which few utilities have.” The authors continue, “...most
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Utilities have a weak organizational starting point relative to emerging competitors. And
the approaches they typically use to manage organizational change, such as companywide quality management or reengineering efforts, are unlikely to drive the type o f
change needed.”*^ The emerging competitors referred to by the authors are not other
traditional utilities. They are non-utility generators (NUGs), independent power
producers (IPPs), investment banks, even arbitrators and natural gas marketers.
Emerging competitors will be companies which are already into successful, competitive
businesses.
One company displaying an understanding o f the new, competitive world is UtiliCorp
United of Kansas City, Missouri. In May 1995, UtiliCorp began marketing its retail
products and services under the EnergyOne brand. Since then, the utility has announced
several agreements as the sole supplier of natural gas to Service Merchandise Corp. and
the gas supplier to the 13,000-member Asian-American Hotel Association. It will be the
preferred supplier of electricity to both organizations once retail delivery is permitted.
UtiliCorp also has signed a contract to supply EnergyOne billing services to 2,200
branches of Bank of America.

The employees who put these deals together did not

come from traditional utility backgrounds. They understood and embraced marketing
concepts that are foreign to most utility employees right now.
Aggregators and brokers outside the utility industry already are changing the market
with their fresh insights, aggressive business tactics and expertise in mass marketing. In
generation, for example, the management of an IPP will better understand the level of
performance required to keep a formally-regulating generating plant competitive in the
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marketplace. Previously, management of the plant was focused on reliability, not
competitiveness in the marketplace. Ratepayers were picking up the tab, so the safety
net of regulation allowed management to run the facility with less concern for
efficiency than the managers of a comparable IPP. In addition, utilities with ineffective
marketing strategies will lose their most profitable customers to such non-utility
competitors, leaving lower-margin key accounts and a dwindling base of mass accounts
once competition reaches the retail sector.
What will be needed at MPC is radical and prompt change to address both the changing
environment and needed employee skills. In their article, “Winning in Electricity
Generation,” authors Lewis Hashimoto, Paul Jansen and Gerrit van Geyn point to the
winners in year 2005 as those who “early on developed strategies that simultaneously
recovered existing generation investments while restructuring their asset portfolios and
repositioning their plants to compete in the new market. Losers will have spent the time
mired in indecision, their strategies ultimately forced upon them by regulators or
competitors.” ^^ MPC has struggled for the last two years with the question of how to
approach the stranded cost recovery issue, keeping management focus diverted from
how to effectively develop new employee skills and set a strategy in motion. By making
the decision to sell its generating assets, the company can now gain a focus on how to
move forward with deregulation.
What is needed to implement an effective aggressive strategy are employees who are
able to create significant improvements in operating performance. Targeting some
“incremental” reduction in last year’s operating costs will not net the changes needed to
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compete in the deregulated environment, especially against emerging competitors who
have never operated under regulation.
Farha notes that three areas need the attention of utility management:
•

Setting the right performcmce aspirations fo r employees. Ideally, utility
companies should set their performance standards at the same level as
today’s top companies in other industries. Performance standards will need
to be higher than ever before, since many of the new entrants in the energy
business are companies who have been successful in a competitive
environment: IPPs, investment banks, natural gas marketers and arbitrage
opportunists.

•

Knowing the company's starting point. Assessing the ability of a company to
change and knowing where the company needs to begin are critical for the
management team of today’s electric utility. Having strategic clarity and
vision, performance goals that stretch the organization, involved employees,
aggressively managed business and production processes, exploitable
information technology and a learning environment that increases employee
effectiveness are all key components o f an effective strategy that cannot be
accomplished unless an organization knows its starting point

•

Building a skill-hased and performance-focused organization. This must
first be done by ensuring the CEO communicates the vision and the strategy
behind the vision, so that employees understand the direction and how they
can contribute. Next, the company should hire nontraditional senior
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managers with skills that were not considered important before, like deal
structuring and marketing. If a current manager has the right intrinsic skills,
but no real experience utilizing such skills for the utility, the CEO must
make it a priority to nurture these skills in that manager. Finally, employees
and managers must be accountable for the success or failure o f the company.
Expectations must be met and everyone, including the CEO, must walk the
talk Employees need to be rewarded for thinking innovatively, working in a
team setting, and focusing on relationship building with external partners,
customers and suppliers.
The new management skills needed to run a successful MPC will not come overnight.
One o f the biggest challenges will be for employees, especially middle management, to
break out of the daily routine of doing things the same old way. Even though MFC
employees may attend seminars or be part of in-house training sessions on how to
prepare for competition, they will find it very difficult to actually come back to work
and change their daily routine. The pressures of their jobs and their daily workload will
push the good intentions aside. According to Douglas K. Smith, author o f ‘Take Charge
of Change - Ten Principles for Managing People and Performance,” it’s not an issue o f
active resistance to change. Rather, roughly 80 percent o f employees facing change are
neither ready for it nor determined to resist it. They just don’t know what to do or what
is expected of them.*^ They also don’t have, or believe they don’t have, the “time” to
change. If senior managers do not set an example for employees to follow, the
confusion employees feel will turn to resistance
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Smith offers the example of Tandem Computers. In 1993, Tandem needed to make
strategic changes in its organization that required the full support o f its sales staff A
key change would require a team selling approach, where the salesperson teamed up
with software and application employees. The purpose was to offer total business
solutions, rather than just selling hardware. So off to a seminar the sales staff went,
creating “from/to” charts that identified the working relationships, skills and behaviors
needed in the new organization. Upon leaving the seminar, everyone was very excited
about what they had learned. But back at their desks, the doubts settled in and the daily
pressures forced the seminar charts and ideas into desk drawers. According to Smith,
‘T he employees were not resisting the change, they just felt reluctant about it and they
didn’t have enough reasons to do things differently. Good ideas - and strategies that can
save the company - go nowhere when people don’t know how to shift from their
existing daily routine to the new one on the chart.” MPC runs this risk for at least four
reasons:
1. Some employees (however irrationally) hold company management
responsible for the change to competition and blame the company for
destabilizing their work environment.
2. With the significant downsizing that has occurred in the past year, many
employees across the company are witnessing involuntary separations for
the first time. The employees that survived the dovmsizing (for the time
being) are disgruntled and untrusting of management.
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3. Everyone believes they are very busy, whether the product of their efforts is
important or not to a competitive company. They are caught in the inertia of
80+ years of utility mindset.
4. Many employees believe they must continue with business as usual, because
competition is something that won’t really effect the company for 3-5 years.
So on one hand, they resent management for changing their environment
and bringing on competition; but on the other, they really don’t believe
competition is going to directly effect them in the foreseeable future.
A common conversation on the streets of Butte, Montana (MPC’s headquarters) is to
claim no knowledge about where MFC is headed and to express serious doubts about
the safety of anyone’s job or the company’s future. This is not an environment where
employees are plugged into the company’s direction and are actively helping to
establish a healthy, highly competitive energy company.
Branding Utility Products
Besides the employee issues and skills discussed above, one of the biggest changes for
today’s utilities will be the need to sell themselves to their customers. Utilities, by
tradition, have not had to concern themselves with issues such as customer perception,
loyalty, or value of the product in the consumer’s eyes. The concern has traditionally
been one of reliability, as defined and enforced by the state PSC. While proven
reliability can be a positive branding point, utilities also must learn how to develop
additional branding strategies that will build value with the customer. One of the more
important strategies is building customer loyalty. According to David Aaker, author of
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“The Value of Brand Equity,” companies should care a lot about their customer brand
loyalty. The value of such loyalty comes from both a predictable sales stream and
administrative and marketing cost reductions. It costs significantly less to keep an
existing customer than it does to attract a new one.^®
For many utilities, this will be the first time considering such things as customer loyalty,
or the development of branding strategies. And it will be a critical time to develop a
sustainable competitive advantage that competes on factors other than price. As Tom
Peters states, “In an increasingly crowded marketplace, fools will compete on price.
Winners will find a way to create lasting value in the customer’s mind.”^‘ This creates a
real challenge for utility management, since their product (electrons) is difficult to
differentiate and the tradition has been to focus on price.
But through difficulty comes creativity, as shown by several utilities in their recent
marketing campaigns. First, PG&E has developed the Clean Choice brand, being
marketed as “green electricity” in California. Clean Choice offers three different options
of renewable power sources: 100%, 50% and 20% power from solar, wind, geothermal,
biomass and small hydro sources, with the remainder of the 50% or 80% coming from
hydro power. None of the Clean Choice products include power from coal, oil or other
fossil fuel, nuclear, wood waste from old growth forests, tire-burning, or solid
municipal waste sources. In addition, a portion of the 100% and 50% mixes includes
energy from “new renewable” sources - wind, solar, geothermal and other renewable
energy plants that will be built in the future, thereby helping to expand the development
of environmentally-friendly energy. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
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has reinforced PG&E’s efforts by including these products on its Environmentally
Preferred Product list.
Second, Edison International, another California-based company, has adopted a strategy
that also focuses on environmental friendliness through product development. In a
recently launched advertising campaign, customers in the Los Angeles area can save up
to $150 on a new electric mulching lawnmower that “mows down pollution” through a
mower trade-in event. Customers are encouraged to turn in their old polluting gasoline
mowers and purchase a new electric mulching mower, which helps reduce gasoline
mower air emissions, gasoline storage, oil changes, and noise pollution. In addition, the
campaign points out that an electric mulching mower chops the nutrient-rich trimmings
into fertilizing mulch, which results in a healthier lawn, less need for watering and no
lawn waste to bag and contribute to the landfill.
Finally, many utilities across the U.S., such as the Kansas City-based UtiliCorp
mentioned earlier, have hired executives from marketing firms and have gone about
differentiating their product by developing a brand name. By developing the EnergyOne
brand, under which retail products and services are marketed, UtiliCorp has
differentiated itself as an energy aggregator;

it offers to put individual packages

together for its customers based on their particular needs and service requirements.
None of these campaigns focus on price or the generic product —electricity. They focus
on new products or services and on differentiating based on the source of the electricity.
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Name or brand awareness is also key to successfully branding a company or product.
The hometown utility usually will have an advantage in this area, since the regulated
customer of yesterday is most likely familiar only with the existing utility. Again
assuming the company has done a good job with reliability and customer service, the
customer usually will have good feelings about the product and level of service. This
gives the local utility two key advantages: the perception of brand quality, via the
expectation of reliability, and name awareness.
To be perceived as reliable attaches quality to the product and can be the beginning of
positive branding. The company will be able to identify its reliability with its brand,
providing a powerful marketing tool to use against competitors. The customer will
develop a brand loyalty and have no desire or motivation to talk to other energy
providers. This will be an important point for MPC after deregulation, especially with
residential customers. It is accepted that MFC has been a reliable utility, a good
corporate citizen and one of the largest employers in the state of Montana. Now the
company must capitalize on this reputation through an effective branding campaign.
Not only will such a campaign cement the company’s relationship with its customers, it
will show the shareholders that the company has a strong company image and an
articulated strategy to address competition. For the shareholder, focusing on short-term
financial goals will not be enough to insure the maximization of wealth in the future.
MPC’s brand image will become equally as important.
New Technologies
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To help accomplish the move to a competitive environment in which energy is traded
on a level playing field, new technologies are called upon to fulfill FERC’s requirement
of a real time, electronic information network.
This system is known to MPC as OASIS (Open Access Same-time Information
System). The purpose of OASIS (or whatever electronic bulletin board a utility is using)
is to provide a medium for the timely distribution of information on the availability and
pricing of transmission services in a manner that does not create an advantage for the
utility operating the OASIS

To comply with this requirement and insure non-

discriminatory access to its transmission system for all wholesale market participants,
MFC will lease space on the BFA OASIS and file written standards of conduct (with
FERC) to govern its use of the OASIS MFC began posting information on BFA’s
OASIS on January 3, 1997.
There is concern that third parties will not receive all pertinent information
simultaneously with the OASIS utility. To ease this concern, FERC has ordered that all
real-time information concerning transmission networks be recorded and placed in
archives, available for audit if a third party files a complaint. FERC indeed may go
further with the oversight of electronic bulletin board systems and decide not to wait for
complaints, but rather establish routine audits.
A side benefit of the competition spurred by FERC Order No. 888 will be technical
innovation in the monitoring o f power consumption. Advances that will be needed by
customers who have a power supply choice will be time-of-use meters and analytical
monitors. Time-of-use meters will become critical in tracking load profiling and
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supplier/consumer energy balancing and billing. Today, these meters are cost
prohibitive to the average residential customer.
According to MPC’s Informational Filing exhibit “ ‘Load Profiling’ a Possible Electric
Utility Restructuring Tool,” the problem today comes from the existing KWh/KW
meters that only provide cumulative billing information for a specified period of time,
usually 30 days. Currently, there is no cost-effective way to find out what a customer’s
power supply needs are in any given hour or day. So an alternative power supplier may
be oversupplying or undersupplying MPC’s system throughout the billing month,
causing MPC to “balance” the system needs with supply on a hourly and daily basis.
Since power is sold by the hour and day, there is potential for a significant cost to MPC
if the alternative power supplier is shorting the system during a peak (high priced)
period Until technology is capable of placing cost-effective time-of-use meters in
residential homes, where metering data can be matched with the customer’s alternative
power supplier on an hour-by-hour or day-by-day basis, the local utility company will
need to be compensated for balancing demand with supply on the system. The utility
will “balance” the system by either producing more electricity from its own generation,
or purchasing power off the transmission grid, via the independent system operator.
Time-of-use meters also will allow greater flexibility in rate setting in on- and off-peak
periods. With technology that can track usage down to the hour, power suppliers will be
able to offer power rates that change on a hourly, daily, or monthly basis. If customers
are incented to conserve power during high demand periods and conversely shift power
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usage to off-peak periods, higher load factors will result in more efficient usage o f the
power supply systems in the United States.
Analytical monitors will provide the energy supplier with downloaded data from the
meter, which can then be combined and analyzed with thousands o f other customer load
profiles. Utilities o f tomorrow will need to be much more knowledgeable about the
usage patterns and supply information o f their customers.
In reality, because purchasing time-of-use meters will be the customer’s (or a courting
energy supplier’s) responsibility and the cost will be prohibitive until technology
catches up, customers will be charged for their usage based on a typical load profile for
that customer class. For example, residential customers typically have peak usage
during the early morning hours and in the early evening, causing the energy supplier to
standby ready to serve at these peak times. Consumption falls off for the rest o f the day,
creating a low load factor (defined as the percentage o f plant capacity being used at any
given time). Low load factors mean inefficient use o f the resource. Customers in this
group will be charged a higher peak-time usage fee, regardless of their individual
energy conservation practices

Therefore, customers who conserve will have an

incentive to upgrade their meter and receive cheaper rates. Thus, the energy supplier
gains a better load factor and society benefits from the more efficient use of generating
resources.
Regulatory Treatments
Prior to MPC’s decision to offer its generating assets for sale, the company would have
considered at length the possible reactions of the MPSC to MPC’s Informational Filing.
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This may have, in fact, been one of the driving forces in deciding to sell the generating
assets o f the company. Given past MPSC actions, the company would have good reason
to expect that a request to cover transition costs over a phase-in period, as the
Informational Filing was seeking, would have been rejected.
In addition, it was predictable that the MCC would resist any action that would disfavor
residential customers in the state. It is not known if the MCC believes open competition
will benefit the average residential customer. But what can be predicted is resistance, by
the MCC, to any attempt to shift costs to the residential class, even if the cost shifting is
simply correcting prior flawed rate design signals.
If an official filing had taken place, as structured in the Informational Filing, the
company’s transition plan would have accomplished at least two significant items for
MPC:
• It would have removed MPSC regulatory oversight of MPC’s generating assets
and launched the company into the competitive energy arena for all the power
that could be produced over and above the native load requirements.
It would have guaranteed the company would recover the majority of its
stranded costs (otherwise uncollectable in a competitive marketplace, i.e.
transition costs) from its captive ratepayers. This significantly reduced the
required market price for incremental sales in the wholesale marketplace. If
MPC could sell at the incremental cost of its thermal or hydro units and flow
the profits to shareholders (rather than reducing the ratepayers revenue
requirement, as is the current case), the company would become stronger

43

financially and more likely to survive under full competition. Currently,
wholesale power sales reduce the revenue required from traditional
ratepayers by approximately $58 million/year.^^ O f this amount, $41 million
is earned from out-of-state sales
The most recent action by MPC, offering its generating assets for sale, effectively limits
the need for regulatory oversight of generating costs to simply reviewing a marketbased contract for power, either from the unregulated Supply Division or outside third
parties. This is assuming, as mentioned earlier, the sale takes place and MPC and the
MPSC have reached agreement on how much o f the sale proceeds will be returned to
the ratepayers and how much will stay with the company and shareholders.
Financial Strength
As already discussed, the future success of a utility in the deregulated world will depend
on many factors. The company’s ability to control cost and develop efficiencies,
utilizing new technologies; transmission interties to desirable markets; the skills o f its
employees and regulatory treatment from the local PSC will all factor into the success
or failure o f tomorrow’s energy companies. Another factor to consider is the financial
strength o f the company. How much of the asset base is tied up in generating assets that
are now going to have to compete in an open marketplace? If the company is a low-cost
producer, financial strength will go up However, many utilities will be competing
against aggressive, independent power producers for the first time and may not in fact
be the low-cost producer. In this case, financial strength will be harmed. Also, if the
utility in the recent past underwent major generation construction projects, the financial
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Strength o f the company could be seriously harmed by deregulation, since the assets
would most likely be considered impaired and of less value to the financial world. In
addition, utilities that have financed such projects with debt will feel an additional
negative effect from those who value the company in the marketplace, since the bond
ratings will undoubtedly slip.
Finally, efficiencies in generation will in large part come from economies of scale, as
they did from airline, natural gas and telecommunication deregulation. Relatively small
utility companies, such as MPC, will not be able to compete effectively with larger
scale operations, especially those closer to large markets. The desire to merge and grow,
gain economies of scale, develop resource balancing between seasonal loads and
capitalize on large, diverse customer bases will drive many utilities to merge or acquire
other companies that can fulfill the new strategic directions being driven by
competition.
Ability to stay the same, merge with or acquire other energy companies
Because o f the new interest in consolidation in order to survive in the deregulated
world, FERC has given significant attention to the questions surrounding utility
mergers, as well as the debate concerning functional and operational “disaggregation.”
Functional disaggregation occurs with the separation of generation, transmission, and
distribution services into individual business units under the same corporate ownership.
Operational disaggregation takes the separation one step further, with the corporate
divestiture of generation, transmission, and distribution into separate corporate entities.

Disaggregation
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As utilities realign for competition, the concerns raised by FERC and state PUCs cover
a wide spectrum of issues. At the core is whether or not utilities should be forced into
operational disaggregation. On either end of the spectrum are two people overseeing the
transition, FERC Commissioner Vickey A. Bailey and Oregon PUC Chairwoman Joan
H. Smith.
According to an article written by Steven M. Fetter, FERC Commissioner Vickey A.
Bailey believes that for a competitive market to thrive, it must operate as free from
government interference as possible. The limited role for government she would allow
tracks FERC’s activity in its Open Access Notice o f Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR),
namely the setting of rules to ensure;
•

Open access on transmission lines

•

A sufficient number of generation competitors

•

That buyers and sellers are not allowed to gain advantage from owning
both generation and transmission

Commissioner Bailey suggests that, while divestiture is not necessary to comply with
FERC’s proposed rules, a corporation might choose to do so as the path o f least
resistance. Bailey’s FERC colleagues, commissioners Massey and Hoecker, echo a
willingness to see if functional disaggregation is sufficient to achieve comparability, or
fair use o f the transmission grid.’^
On the other end of the spectrum is Oregon PUC Chairwomen Joan H. Smith. She
believes operational disaggregation is mandatory to insure a competitive environment.
According to Fetter, Smith maintains that without divestiture, 'there is a continued need
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for regulatory oversight to prevent self-dealing abuses.” By demanding divestiture, the
stage is set for competitiveness with little regulatory intervention. The need for
regulators at either the state or federal level would be minimized and the need o f the
public to have competitively priced energy would be met by the marketplace rather than
by regulation.
Other points to consider are:
•

Whether forcing o f companies to divest their assets can stand the test o f
demonstrable benefits to both wholesale and retail customers. Raising
concerns over this issue is Chairwomen Susan F. Clark - Florida Public
Service Commission. She questions the wisdom of forcing the separation o f
generation and transmission facilities, since the electric industry has
historically planned and optimized its generation and transmission facilities
as one unit, with instantaneous communication between the system
dispatcher and his/her transmission counterpart, to insure system reliability
and economics. Redundancy o f facilities and staff becomes a concern, as
well as the state’s ability to meet the needs of its retail customers when the
jurisdiction over two of the three components (generation and transmission)
has significantly diminished. According to Clark, ‘TJnlike the natural gas
industry, which was disaggregated by the FERC, market-priced and
embedded-cost electric generation and transmission facilities cannot be
cleanly separated into FERC-regulated wholesale facilities and stateregulated retail facilities. We are concerned that retail ratepayers will be
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required to pay for much o f the cost of this competitive reform, but that
wholesale market participants will reap much o f the

b e n e f i t . ” ^?

Clark is

concerned that state regulators, who are now charged with establishing fair
and nondiscriminatory retail electric rates from investor-owed utilities, will
lose control over the cost and revenue structure of generation and
transmission facilities.
Also, the Florida PSC, (like Montana) has been the sole forum for
determining the need for major power plants and transmission facilities.
Would this responsibility be shifted to the federal level? If so, how are the
needs and concerns of the state’s residents represented? It is possible that the
federal government would protect the wholesale power market at the cost of
the state’s retail customers and residents?
•

I f a stand-alone generation company can attract the necessary capital to
build new production facilities. Or, as suggested by Ohio’s PUC Chairman
Craig A. Glazer, “is the industry structure a natural monopoly where only a
few ‘megaplayers’ will be able to attract the capital needed to build new
plants?”^'*

•

I f system reliability will be compromised by the potential breakup o f
corporations. Glazer cautions that while the theory o f disaggregation makes
sense from an economic and perhaps societal view, it may not make sense
from an engineering point of view. He states that we should look back and
remember why the electric utility industry was structured as a vertically
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integrated system. “Electrons listen the laws of physics and not the laws of
any governing body. The system was built as an integrated one, since this
was the most efficient means, from an engineering point of view, to deliver
these vital electrons to customers distant from the power plants that generate
them.” Glazer poses the question, “Can the system operate fully
disaggregated where no single entity has operational control over the vital
parts o f the system?”^
This raises a follow-up question: does the current effort to make the market
more efficient cause the physical operation o f the production and
transmission facilities to become less efficient? If so, what is the net gain to
society? State and federal regulators need to consider these critical questions
when setting the direction for electric industry deregulation.
MPC has restructured the corporation to accomplish functional disaggregation,
establishing two divisions — Energy Supply Division and Energy and Communication
Services Division, along with realigning transmission services into the Energy and
Communication Services Division. According the Mr. Pascoe, ‘Tunctional unbundling
is apparent in MPC’s new organizational structure. Prior to this reorganization, MPC
generation and transmission (G&T) activities were combined in a single business unit.
Now generation is part of MPC’s Energy Supply Division and transmission is part of
MPC’s Energy and Communications Services Division. In addition, we have divided
our formerly integrated control center activities to comply with the functional
unbundling concept. Staff at our Systems Operations Control Center (SOCC), which is
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part o f the Energy and Communications Services Division, are now responsible for
operating the transmission system and for maintaining overall system reliability. Former
SOCC staff responsible for economic dispatch of MPC’s generating plants and for
wholesale power transactions are now part o f the Energy Supply Division and have
been relocated to a ‘trading floor’ environment in another MFC facility.

Mergers
While a great deal o f attention has been given to whether or not corporations should be
forced to disaggregate, equal regulatory attention has been paid to questions raised by
potential mergers in this new competitive environment FERC Commissioner Massey
states “a merger which is truly ‘consistent with the public interest’ must not have a
deleterious effect on competition.”^^ He indicates that FERC and state regulators should
be cautious in approving mergers that allow a concentration of generation assets, while
favoring mergers that create regional transmission grids. There has been little merger
activity so far to support the idea that companies are actively pursuing mergers for the
purpose o f developing regional transmission grids, or avoiding mergers that concentrate
generating assets.
In the past, mergers were analyzed by regulators based on each merger’s impact on
costs. Because rates were cost-based, cost savings due to the merger were the key
determining factor in approving the merger. To the extent there were cost savings, these
savings could be passed on to consumers through rate reductions. Moving to a
competitive environment where rates will be set by the supply and demand of the
market changes the focus o f regulators. Now, mergers can have an undesirable result.
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from a societal view, if the generation function is inappropriately concentrated, thus
restricting competition. Future evaluations of mergers will need to be based upon
thorough analysis of the impact the merger will have on market power and competition.
From the company’s viewpoint, mergers can be difficult and disadvantageous, given
many conflicting (and sometimes competing) regulatory views, from FERC vs. state
jurisdiction to varying state regulatory policies and philosophies.
An example of an attempted utility merger that ultimately was abandoned because of
regulatory confusion is the Washington Water Power (WWP) of Washington and Sierra
Pacific Resources of Nevada merger proposed on June 27, 1994. The merger was
abandoned in June 1996.
In WWP’s July 8, 1996 SEC 8-K filing, the company gave the following explanation
for canceling the merger:
“On June 28, 1996, the Board of Directors of The Washington Water Power
Company (“Company”) terminated the Agreement and Plan of Reorganization
and Merger, dated as of June 27, 1994 (the "Merger Agreement"), by and among
the Company, Sierra Pacific Resources, a Nevada corporation ("SPR"), Sierra
Pacific Power Company, a Nevada corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of SPR ("SPPC") and Altus Corporation, a Nevada corporation and a whollyowned subsidiary of the Company ("Altus"), which would have provided for the
merger of the Company, SPR and SPPC with and into Altus. The Board of
directors noted the significant disparity in views among the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (the "FERC"), as reflected in the position of its Staff,
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and the state regulatory commissions having primary jurisdiction over the
companies. The FERC was concerned with wholesale markets at the national
level

Each state commission, on the other hand, was concerned with the

interests of retail customers in its particular jurisdiction. The Board concluded
that there was little chance of obtaining approval of the proposed merger from
each o f the regulatory commissions having jurisdiction, on terms consistent with
the regulatory principles adopted by the companies and satisfactory to each
other commission.
In addition, the Board concluded that even if the proposed merger were
consummated, Altus would be subject to significant continuing risk of
inconsistent regulation, with the stockholders of Altus bearing the financial
consequences of such inconsistency.”^^
While mergers will undoubtedly occur, as deregulation goes forward and markets
become less defined by geography and state boundaries, the concerns of regulators
about unhealthy concentration of generating assets, and the concerns of company’s
about inconsistent treatment from multiple jurisdictions, will need to be resolved to the
satisfaction of all parties.

m.

IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON MFC

The New World of Competition
In order to contemplate the effects o f deregulation on MPC, there needs to be an
assessment of how the company has responded to competition up until this point. MPC
has not seen itself as a leader in setting the off-system pricing for the region, rather a
taker o f available market price. Unfortunately, in normal or high run-off years, the
price-setter in the Northwest has been the BP A, which has a very small incremental cost
to produce from its hydro facilities, plus a tax free status as a governmental agency. In
addition, BPA owns a large portion o f the 500 KV transmission system between
Montana and major West Coast markets, with rights to set transmission prices that
could perhaps discriminate against their competitors (in the world before deregulation).
With these advantages, the BPA has been able to suppress wholesale power rates in the
Northwest for many years, effectively dominating the marketplace to the exclusion o f
all others. This has left MPC with little financial incentive to offer its excess generation
into the marketplace.
With deregulation, MPC will have the first real opportunity to compete in a marketplace
where eventually there will be numerous competitors and relative ease of entry. As
pointed out by Dr. Shephard in his pre-filed testimony before the MPSC, “competition
is usually not fully effective when there is dominance by one firm or a tight oligopoly
with only two or three firms holding nearly all the market. The deregulated market will
usually need to evolve past these types so as to contain numerous strong competitors
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Deregulation will open this door for MPC, and for those competitors that will seek
MPC’s customers, without the market-surpressing influence o f BPA.
As previously mentioned, MPC has in the past penalized its large industrial customers,
by increasing rates above the true cost of service, so these customers could subsidize
rates charged to the residential class. With the implementation of FERC Order No. 888,
MPC’s large industrial customers will be able to shop for the most competitive energy
supplier. And these new energy suppliers are waiting in the wings to serve in an open
marketplace that is dictated by price rather than legislation and monopoly power.
The new world of competition for MPC will first result in these large industrial
customers, which make up approximately one-half of the utility’s regulated revenue
stream, being able to seek new power suppliers. With this high of an exposure to load
loss, MPC must either take quick action to correct the overcharge of rates to the large
industrial class, or embrace deregulation and attempt to replace lost revenue with new
opportunities presented by deregulation. Either way, MPC’s large industrial customers
will be the first to experience deregulation, followed by commercial customers and then
finally residential customers. A schedule of how MPC proposes to transition to a
competitive environment is presented in the next section.
If MPC is not successful in restructuring the company to immediately address the
effects o f deregulation, the company stands to lose one of its largest revenue classes and
will not be positioned to take advantage of the opportunities brought on by open
competition.
Changes in the M ontana Regulatory and Legislative Environm ent
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To bring about FERC mandate to open transmission systems nationwide, states must
take action to undo the regulated environment. To this end, on Tuesday, April 15, 1997,
the Montana legislature passed into law the Electric Restructuring and Customer Choice
law, authorizing the restructuring o f the state’s electric utility industry. Montana is the
second western state, behind California, to pass legislation that will put into effect
deregulation at the state level.
The focus of the Montana legislation includes:
•

calling for customer choice of supplier as soon as July 1, 1998, but no later
than July 1, 2002

•

a two-year rate freeze on customer rates

•

an additional two-year rate freeze on the energy component o f bills for
residential and commercial customers

•

provisions for recovery o f utilities’ stranded costs

According to the law, actual recovery o f the stranded costs a utility may incur will be
determined by the MPSC after a review of the stranded costs and the utility’s efforts to
mitigate such costs. As previously mentioned, MFC has changed direction and will not
be seeking the recovery of stranded costs. Rather, the company has chosen to sell its
generating assets on the open market, effectively eliminating stranded generating costs,
which was the bulk o f MPC’s stranded cost recovery request. This change has
undoubtedly simplified the cost recovery issue for MPC and the State.
To begin deregulation, MPC filed a transition plan with the MPSC on July 2, 1997.
MPC’s plan calls for customer choice to be available to the company’s 75-100 largest
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customers by July 1, 1998 (these customers consume approximately 40 percent o f the
company’s electricity). The next layer allowed choice would be approximately 10% of
the residential and small commercial customers, who could seek alternative suppliers by
July, 2000. Half of the remaining customers would be allowed to exit MPC’s generation
by July, 2001, with the remaining customers going to full choice by July, 2002. In the
near term, the company proposes to establish pilot programs to help develop the
administrative functions related to choice.
In addition to the schedule for transition, other items under consideration by the MPSC
include: establishing a cost-based contract between MPC’s Supply (unregulated) and
Energy Services (regulated) Divisions for customers who do not have a viable choice
during the transition period; establishment of a USBC, earlier defined as a Universal
System Benefit Charge, to provide for conservation research and low-income
assistance; potential changes in MPC’s organizational structure; and standards of
conduct for the utility in a competitive environment.
With these actions o f the Montana legislature and MPSC, Montana is headed down the
path o f becoming an early entrant into the new competitive marketplace of the WSCC.
Company Profile
Company Establishment and Structure
MPC came into existence 1912, beginning as a small regional electric company. From
the original electric business, supported primarily by hydro operations, Montana Power
expanded into natural gas service in 1931, and in 1951 became the first major utility in
the United States to import natural gas from Canada. As possible hydroelectric sites
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became more scarce, Montana Power acquired coal reserves in eastern Montana in
1959, and began its surface mining ventures in 1968, expanding to Texas lignite fields
in 1985. The non-utility ventures also included oil and natural gas businesses.
Telecommunications - required to link one of the nation's most wide-spread electric
transmission operations - became a commercial venture in 1984. In 1988, the company
began its independent power operation to manage long-term contracts for the non-utility
sale of electricity from Colstrip Unit 4, and to invest in non-utility generating plants.
The following provides a description o f the major components o f MPC’s operations.
Utility Electric Operations
MPC’s Utility Electric System extends through the western two-thirds of Montana.
Generating capability is provided by four coal-fired thermal generation units, with total
net capability available to the Utility o f 683,000 kW, and 12 hydroelectric projects and
one storage dam, with total net median water capability of 474,400 kW. The thermal
units are
(1) Colstrip Unit 3, which has a net capability o f 740,000 kW, of which the
Company owns 222,000 kW;
(2) Colstrip Units 1 and 2, with a combined net capability of 614,000 kW, of
which the Utility owns 307,000 kW, and;
(3) the wholly-owned 154,000 kW Corette Plant. Western Energy, a subsidiary
o f MPC, supplies all of the Colstrip coal requirements under long-term
contracts. The Corette Plant is supplied under a short-term contract from a nonMPC Wyoming mine. Reliability o f service is enhanced by the location o f
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hydroelectric generation on two separate watersheds with different precipitation
characteristics and by various sources of thermal generation.
In addition to the Utility's hydroelectric and thermal resources, it currently receives
electricity through 18 contracts totaling 353,300 kW of firm winter peak capacity.
These contracts vary in type, size, seller and ending dates. Again, the generating plants
at Colstrip, plus the hydroelectric operations currently are for sale.
At December 31, 1997, the Utility owned and operated 6,889 miles of transmission
lines and 15,639 miles o f distribution lines. Transmission lines are high voltage lines
that move power across a system (i.e. from Colstrip to various substations on the MPC
system, or to BPA’s transmission system) while distribution lines deliver low voltage
power to the ultimate end user (i.e. from the substation to the residential house).

Natural Gas Utility Operations
The Utility currently produces minimal amounts of natural gas from fields in southern
Montana and Wyoming. The Utility transferred almost all of its natural gas production
properties in the United States and all of its Canadian natural gas production properties
to an unregulated subsidiary on November 1, 1997, as a result of the Company's natural
gas restructuring filing with the PSC. All of the Utility's natural gas customers are
served from its 2,104 miles of transmission system and 3,451 miles of distribution
mains, which extends through the western two-thirds o f Montana. System reliability is
enhanced by four natural gas storage fields which enable the Utility to store natural gas
in excess of system load requirements during the summer for delivery during winter
periods of peak demand.
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Non-Utility Oil & Gas Properties
As mentioned above, the Non-Utility operations include the transfer o f almost all o f the
production properties from the Utility operations in 1997. Also in 1997, the company
completed two major acquisitions, purchasing Vessels Energy’s oil and gas assets in
Colorado’s Denver-Julesburg (D-J) Basin and a natural gas processing and fractionating
plant near MPC’s existing Fort Lupton, Colorado plant. This purchase allows the
company to enter the fractionated liquids business in the Denver area.
Currently, MPC owns or leases over 1,000 producing gas wells and 185 producing oil
wells, in addition to owning and operating an 800-mile gas-gathering system in Alberta
and the western United States. The Non-Utility Oil & Gas operations o f MPC can
expect to grow over the next several years, as evidenced by plans to spend up to $56
million in 1998 for exploration, acquisition and development of oil and gas properties.
The Non-Utility Oil & Gas operations o f the company are a significant part of MPC’s
continued growth and diversification strategy.
Independent Power Properties
MPC’s Independent Power Operations (IPO) develop, acquire, operate and maintain,
and manage facilities and resources to provide electricity and other energy-related
services. Colstrip 4 Lease Management Division sells the Company's 222 megawatt
share of Colstrip Unit 4 generation principally to the Los Angeles Department o f Water
and Power and to Puget Sound Energy, Inc. under contracts with a term through
December 29, 2010. The Colstrip 4 leasehold interest and its related assets and
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liabilities and contract obligations are intended to be sold with the regulated electric
generating facilities and power purchase contracts.
The IPO, through Continental Energy Services (CES), an MFC non-regulated
subsidiary, develops and invests in power projects, and currently holds ownership
interests in seven operating, natural gas fired projects located in Texas, New York,
Washington and the United Kingdom, one heavy oil-fired project located in Jamaica
and one gas-fired independent power project under construction in Pakistan. CES,
through a wholly-owned subsidiary, is the managing general partner o f a 255 MW
project located in Texas. In addition, CES is participating with others in the
development of a coal-fired project in India and an 800 MW gas-fired project in Texas.
The interests in these projects are not being offered for sale with the regulated electric
generating facilities.
Finally, CES holds a 50% interest in North American Energy Services Company, which
provides energy-related support services including the operation and maintenance of
power plants. The interest in North America is not being offered for sale at this time.
Telecommunications Properties
MPC seems to be focusing most heavily on growing its telecommunications properties.
Currently, Touch America has a 3,000-mile fiber optic network covering a seven-state
region extending from Seattle, Washington to St. Paul, Minnesota and from Denver,
Colorado to the Canadian border. Touch America continues to expand its network
capacity. An additional 1,620 miles of fiber network being built will widen Touch
America's service territory to 11 states. In January 1997, the Company acquired 12
licenses in 12 marketing areas between Minneapolis, Minnesota and Seattle,
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Washington along the route o f the fiber optic network, which presents an opportunity
for wireless telephone service in that region.^^ These licenses allow larger volumes of
traffic via a wider band widths and also allow the by-pass of local wired service. Touch
America will begin beta testing the by-pass of US West copper wire in 1999. If
successful, this new technology will open up local service to Touch America, a
significant new field for the company
Diverse Resource Base
As described above, the company has a diverse resource base that would have provided
a competitive advantage in the deregulated marketplace, if the stranded cost recovery
issues were not overwhelming. The coal-fired plants at Colstrip serve to balance
hydroelectric availability, which (as mentioned earlier) are spread between two
drainages, fiirthering the company’s ability to efficiently operate its generation
facilities.

The balancing capabilities of MPC’s generating assets, via

coal-

fired/hydroelectric and separate drainage for the hydro operations, will add to the value
of the assets for sale.
The 6,900 miles of transmission lines in the state provides the backbone of the
transmission system between Colstrip and the West Coast market. MFC’s system has
interconnections to five major transmission systems located in the Western Systems
Coordinating Council (WSCC) area, as well as one relatively small interconnection to a
system that connects with the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) region. With
these interconnections, the Montana Power Company electric transmission system is
strategically located to allow for the purchase and delivery o f power in diverse markets
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- from the Pacific Northwest, to the desert Southwest and California, to the Colorado
area, and to a limited extent, the MAPP region.
Not to be forgotten in evaluating the diversity o f MPC’s resource base are the two areas
o f the company that can offer more to the customer than just electricity. The natural gas
and telecommunication properties give the company an opportunity to provide one-stop
shopping for many types of customers. An example o f this is provided in the SWOT
analysis section discussion on the California Manufacturing Association
Customer Loads & Relationships
Service Area and Sales
The Utility's service territory comprises 107,600 square miles or approximately 73% of
Montana. Within its service territory, 86% of the state's population resides. MPC serves
approximately 603,000 residents, or 80% of the population within the service territory.
Additionally, energy is provided to cooperatives that serve approximately 76,000
residents.
Dominant factors in Montana's economy are agriculture and livestock, which together
constitute Montana's largest industry. Other factors are tourism and recreation, coal and
metals mining, oil and natural gas production, and the forest products industry, which
includes the production of pulp and paper, plywood and lumber.
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Electric service is provided to 191 communities, the rural areas surrounding them and
Yellowstone National Park, and natural gas service is provided to 109 communities.
Firm electric power is sold at wholesale to two rural electric cooperatives
In addition, the company also sells discounted power to California manufacturers and
other out-of-state purchasers, such as to the city of Los Angeles and competing utilities
in the WSCC. Natural gas is sold at wholesale to distribution companies in Great Falls,
Cut Bank, Shelby, Kevin, Sweetgrass and Sunburst, Montana. Additional gas purchases
are made by out-of-state brokers, who move MFC gas as far away as Texas and
Southern California.
Cost of Service
MPC’s cost of service, which determines the revenue requirement requested by the
company, is made up of two major components:
•

Operating expenses, such as: purchased power expense, operating and maintenance
costs o f the generating plants, as well as the transmission and distribution facilities,
administrative and general expenses, depreciation/amortization and income taxes.
These costs are captured on the company’s books and records and are “normalized”
as part of the rate filing, to eliminate any one-time or abnormal charges in the
company’s books. MFC’s cost of service, before the calculation for a return on rate
base, added up to $352.9 million for the 12 months ended December 31, 1995, per
Exhibit 5 (column Y, row 56). If this amount is collected through rates, the
company will just breakeven on its operating costs.
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A return on rate base, which covers the cost o f debt financing and compensates the
equity owners for their investment. The return on rate base is calculated by taking
the weighted average cost of capital for the utility times the electric utility rate base
o f the company. The rate base is primarily made up of capital investments made by
the utility, which amounted to $1,063 billion as o f December 31, 1995. The
weighted cost o f capital for MPC’s December 31, 1995 rate filing was 9.59%,
creating a requested return on rate base of $102.1 million.

The requested return on rate base is added to the cost of service calculation above to
create the company’s revenue requirement request for the December 31, 1995 test
period filing.
With the revenue requirements typically granted to MFC (which have been at times
significantly less than the requested revenue requirement), the company has
traditionally been considered a low cost provider of electricity, in comparison to other
utilities in the western United States. As Exhibit 6 shows, MPC’s rates for its large
commercial and small industrial customers rank second lowest, next to rates in Boise,
Idaho (which is served by Idaho Power).
Residential rates rank 5^ of the eleven utilities compared. The residential class rates,
even though large industrial customers have subsidized them, are not as low priced as
other utilities in the West. This is primarily due to the lack o f a significant population
base in Montana to absorb the fixed capital costs o f distributing power to a large
geographic service area. This also causes the small commercial customers to pay the 5*
highest rates, by comparison.
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As previously mentioned, MPC’s large industrial customers have felt the effects of
MPC’s rate design methodology, as shown by the difference between small industrial,
which has the second lowest rates and large industrial, which come in 4^ in its category.
Without conducting a cost o f service study, it can only be hypothesized that MPC’s
large industrial customers would most probably pay the 2“** lowest rates if true cost-ofservice rate making were applied.
Labor Force
At December 31, 1997, the Company and its subsidiaries employed 2,903 persons,
including 385 employees at the jointly owned Colstrip Units 1-4. Over 500 employees
work at the generating facilities now for sale.
O f the 2,903 persons, 1,038 are members of collective bargaining units consisting o f 16
unions. Current union contracts will expire at various times during the next 4 years,
with 14 contracts expiring in 1998.
Corporate Culture
MPC’s corporate culture is changing, probably more now than anytime in the past. The
catalyst for this change can only be speculated, but people familiar with the company
attribute the change to two major factors: deregulation and a new style of leadership.
Deregulation spawned the restructuring of the company into two divisions, Energy
Supply and Energy and Services/Telecommunications. This action further led to the
creation o f the Shared Administrative Services function. With these changes came an
assignment of officers to each of these three key areas. All of these changes combine to
help the company culturally in several ways: having an officer in charge of all aspects
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o f supply or all aspects o f energy services (distribution) or shared administrative
services has enhanced the coordination of employee efforts in their respective areas and
has improved the focus of each division.
The reorganization has also reduced the “us vs. them” culture previously seen between
Entech (the company’s non-utility arm) and MPC’s, in addition to eliminating the
redundant work being done by Entech and MPC’s duplicated administrative
departments. For example, collapsing duplicate tax, human resource, accounting and
auditing departments into one department for each area has not only saved money, but
has put employees together who previously may have had little contact with each other.
In short, the reorganization o f MPC has helped eliminate former walls between Entech
and MPC employees.
Other evidence o f cultural change is the pay structure changes and promotion
opportunities. Until recently, employees received pay raises and promotions based
primarily on longevity with the company. The exception to this has always been the
compensation plan for Touch America, which has for years been tied to the financial
success of Touch America.
Not too long ago, offering an incentive program to employees that were directly
responsible for the success (or failure) of the oil and gas trading programs was
dismissed as a bad idea. It was believed that if this were done for one group of
employees, others would feel slighted. These were the same employees who were being
courted by large oil companies who used employee compensation incentive programs
that rewarded performance on the job. The main reason there was not an exodus fi’om
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MPC and Entech is because the workforce is primarily Butte-bom people who prefer
not to leave their hometown.
While compensation plans are not public knowledge, it is known that incentive plans
today are much more common at MFC. Employee expectations are being redefined to
reward productive actions and behaviors. Thinking innovatively, working in teams and
going the extra mile for a customer are all becoming part o f the employee appraisal
system.
It will take a frustratingly long time for the majority o f the workforce to understand and
support the cultural change that is taking place. But if this new culture can be instilled
in everyone from the mailroom on up, the workforce will become part of the success of
the company.
One of the hardest cultural changes for MFC will be getting employees to break out of
their daily routine long enough to evaluate whether or not that routine is adding any
value to the new company. It cannot be left up to management to go around to every
employee and evaluate every task against the new yardstick So employees must be
coached and trained to see their jobs in a new light and be rewarded for improving or
revamping processes critical to the success of the new organization. This is much easier
said than done, because no employee wants to believe what he/she has been doing is or
will be o f no value, or may be a job that can be eliminated.
A new culture of learning also is important. If the previous skill sets of the employees
are based in traditional utility operations, then they will be of little value to the new
company, especially after the sale of the generating assets. Bringing in new people who
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have experience in aggressive marketing, deal structuring, actively managing processes
and exploiting information technology will set a standard for others to follow. Perhaps
this was MFC’s thought behind the recent hiring of a new Vice President of Marketing.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in Relationship

to

a

Deregulated Market
THE BUILDING OF A STRATEGY
Evaluating Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in the New Marketplace
An analysis o f MFC’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) in the
new marketplace is critical to evaluating the potential effects o f deregulation on the
company. In a deregulated environment, it will be important to know MFC’s distinctive
competencies and to match them to the new opportunities and risks presented by
deregulation A SWOT analysis answers these competency and opportunity questions.
Ideally, this analysis becomes a building block in establishing a corporate strategy that
will exploit both MFC’s strengths and market opportunities. Likewise, such an analysis
is necessary to assess weaknesses and new threats in the marketplace, with the goal of
either addressing the weakness with an improvement plan or mitigating the threats by a
new course of action.
When an industry goes through major changes, the framework in which it operates must
be evaluated and reassessed by the standards now relevant in the “new” industry.
According to Michael Porter, “The framework for viewing strengths and weaknesses
illuminate two fundamentally different types: structural and implementational.”^^
Structural strengths and weaknesses are determined by the characteristics of the
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industry, while implementational strengths and weaknesses are determined by employee
and management ability to execute the strategy.

Structural Strengths and Weaknesses
Traditionally, MPC, as well as the rest of the electric utility industry, has based its
structural strengths on reliability of service and the guarantee o f cost recovery (plus a
return on rate base) via ratepayers. This had been done with the promise of a regulatory
barrier against the entry of local competition, to protect both the ratepayer and the
utility investor. While the promise of cost recovery was not always kept by the Montana
PSC, the structural framework of cost recovery and utility franchise kept MPC’s
investors satisfied for many decades and allowed enough return on rate base for the
company to continue providing reliable service to the ratepayers of Montana.
In contrast, a deregulated environment means new structural strengths and weaknesses
will be established for the industry. The main structural focus will be on competitively
marketing energy in both current and new geographic regions. Reliability of service will
still be important, but it will not be the only consideration. The ability of a utility to cost
effectively implement technological advances, such as time-of-use meters and analytical
monitors, will factor into the consumer’s decision making. New power supplies will be
developed on a much smaller scale, because of technological advances that already have
taken place in generation and the access to other under-utilized plants within the
transmission grid. Utility companies increasing will use contracted firms to build and
manage power plants. The dependence on regulatory approval, to determine if and when
a power plant gets built, will be gone. Instead, energy can and will be traded by firms
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that do not own one kilowatt o f electricity. The actual production of the energy will take
a back seat to coordinating delivery across several transmission grids, ultimately
providing power to a consumer several states away.
The real challenge for MPC will come from determining the relevant structural
components for the new energy supply industry and reassessing its employee base in
light of the need for new skills and capabilities. The company must move away from the
temptation to prepare for competition by downsizing and cost-cutting. Instead, a
marketing mindset must be instilled and information systems must be installed to
support those who need the information to make marketing decisions.
Implementational Strengths and Weaknesses
Implementational strengths and weaknesses are identified by the ability of the company
to implement its strategy. A company without the right skill set in its employees and
managers will not be able to implement new strategy, let alone survive in a competitive
world. Competition has caused a shift in what is now considered the right skills for
utility personnel, with authority and accountability being shifted away from senior
corporate management, toward those operating the power plants, transmission system
and trading floor.

Operating managers are beginning to have ‘^bottom-line”

responsibilities for the first time. This is characteristic of the management style of one
of the biggest emerging competitors in the energy business —NUGs, previously defined
as Non-Utility

G e n e r a to r s .^ ^

utilities are discovering that plants can be run more

efficiently, with fewer employees. Many jobs previously done by company employees
can be outsourced (at a substantial savings) to third-party personnel, especially ancillary
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services such as accounting and tax preparation. Utilities also have discovered that
distracting management time on services that can just as easily be accomplished by an
unaffiliated professional firm frees up senior management to concentrate on growing
the business. Similar to NUGs, utilities will likely see outsourcing firms as an
indispensable resource of the future.
Strategy
Business strategy typically will be targeted at one of four strategic areas —
differentiation, technology, cost, or service.
It will be important for MPC to establish a strategy that answers the question “Which
strategic area should the company compete in?” The choice may be determined by
selecting the existing area that involves the best trade-off between profit potential and
cost to compete, or by selecting an entirely new strategic area. With deregulation
changing the way the company plans for the future, now would be the time to consider
Porter’s caution that while a low cost position within a strategic area may well be
critical, a focus on low cost position overall is not necessarily important or the only way
to compete. In fact, becoming the low cost producer in a competitive environment may
involve unacceptable sacrifices in one of the other strategic areas. Customers will
tolerate higher rates from an energy supplier that provides exceptional service or has a
new technology to offer, as long as the price is not so high as to induce the customer to
give up on the better service or new technology. The customer’s choice also may hinge
on loyalty developed through effective branding programs.
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Thinking in such terms is new for MPC. Traditionally, the focus has been on reliable,
utility-type service and justifiable (to the PSC) operating costs and capital investments.
MPC Strenphs
MPC has a competitive advantage over a utility that has solely operated as a vertically
integrated company, as well as skills and knowledge of the employees in the non
regulated side o f the business.
Entech, formed in 1982, has owned and operated the non-utility assets of the
corporation, including coal mines, oil and gas fields in Canada and the U.S.,
telecommunications and an unregulated power producer. Continental Energy Services.
Continental Energy Services (CES) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MPC Beginning
operations in 1988, CES has been in the energy marketing game through its role as an
investor in unregulated power generation plants in the U.S. and abroad. Led by Dick
Cromer, who now serves as the Vice-President of MPC’s newly formed Energy Supply
Division, CES has gained some of the necessary experience for the deregulated
generation business. While CES’s actual depth o f knowledge in the deregulated market
is still in question, the existence and experience o f this company is definitely a strength
for MPC.
In addition to CES, another strength is in the telecommunications division, headed by
Mike Meldahl. While a very small part of the corporation in both asset base and
revenue, the telecommunication division holds the promise of growth and possesses
critical marketing skills. In 1997, Touch America contributed 6% to the corporation’s
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earning before interest and taxes (EBIT), a figure expected to grow significantly as
Touch America aggressively expands its fiber optic network over the next year.
The telecommunication division o f MPC is made up of two subsidiaries — Touch
America (formally TRI Touch America) and Tetragenics. Touch Amercia (TA) is a
long distance telecommunications provider with service from Seattle to Minneapolis.
Even smaller revenues are generated by TA’s sister company — Tetragenics, the
automated systems arm of MFC. Tetragenics expertise lies in developing and
maintaining automated hydro facility systems. Although formally incorporated in 1982,
Tetragenics began in 1972 when some engineers at MFC used a computer to automate a
power plant. Their efforts helped start Tetragenics. Since then, the company has become
an innovator and leader in the hydroelectric and data acquisition systems, pioneering
one of the first efforts to use a computer to control a hydroelectric power plant
successfully. Tetragenics employees know firsthand the effects of no revenue contracts
in the door — no jobs. The company went through a relatively large layoff in 1985
because there was no work. This is an unusual event for an employee attached to MFC,
or any other utility for that matter, giving the surviving employees and management a
glimpse o f life in an unprotected industry
For many years, the telecommunication division’s employees have known how to be
lean and mean in the marketplace. The future of the division depended on cost saving
measures, strong marketing skills and a customer service focus. While the average
employee at Entech (where Touch America formerly resided) was in typical corporate
mode, not particularly aware of the cost of doing business or where the next revenue
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dollar for the company was coming from, TA employees were trying to figure out how
they could get by with less expense. Also, marketing was, and still is, in the blood of
TA employees, reinforced by a pay system tied to company performance. For these
reasons, the telecommunication division of MPC is positioned for competition and can
be counted as a strength of MPC
According to strategic research from Frost and Sullivan on U.S. strategies for utilities in
telecommunications, the Telecommunications Act o f 1996 presents new opportunities
for utilities to leverage their customer base and valuable rights-of-way by offering
bundled telecommunication and electric services, a package that is expected to be very
popular according to the authors. This structure leads to a competitive advantage in that
the utility already has established an extensive customer base, a reputation for providing
reliable, high quality service and has a billing mechanism already in place. In addition,
the telecommunications industry expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of
7%, compared with a stagnant 1.1% growth for the electric power industry for the
forecast period 1996-2003.^" MPC is well positioned to bundle telecommunications and
electric service and to be a seasoned participant in the high growth telecommunications
industry.
The coal operations o f the company also can be considered a real strength for the
deregulated future for two reasons:
1.

The coal business has become very competitive over the last decade,
with the Powder River Basin over-supply, lower taxes on coal mined and
inexpensive overburden removal costs. MPC’s Western Energy mine in

74

Colstrip has had to compete with the Powder River Basin (PRB) supply in
the Midwestern market, requiring cost-cutting and strategy planning
indicative of a competitive company
MFC’s other coal mine, Northwestern Resources Co. (NWR) in Jewett,
Texas, also has had to respond to increasing pressure from the PRB. NWR, a
mine-mouth operation for Houston Light & Power’s (HL&P) Limestone
Plants, just recently has come under the pressure o f litigation by HL&P.
HL&P is attempting to break its life-of-mine contract with NWR, in the
hopes o f capitalizing on the cheaper PRB coal NWR must prove to a jury
that it runs an efficient, cost-effective operation and has done no harm to
HL&P The mine’s plans for demonstrating a cost-effective future are
equally as important as its past performance. This is another indication of the
competitive nature o f coal mining and a demonstration o f the skill set within
the company. A mine previously considered captive now has to prove it is a
cost-efficient, competitive operation.
2.

The contract administration department and management at Western
Energy has established relationships over the years with utilities, energy
analysts, governmental agencies and non-utility power producers throughout
the United States. These connections have proven valuable in establishing
joint ventures in both coal and plant operations over the past several years.
For example. Western Syncoal (WSC) was formed through a joint-venture
between Northern States Power and Western Energy with the purpose of
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commercializing a clean coal technology product. This $60 million capital
investment project was 50% funded by the Department of Energy, with on
going funding of the operation for a five-year period. This project would
most likely not have been done without the relationships developed by
Western Energy personnel.
MFC’s ability to further build customer loyalty will be a critical part o f the new
structure and strategy. Customer loyalty becomes a valuable marketing tool for
companies going through deregulation. This is consistent with what has happened with
the deregulation o f the telecommunication industry. In telecommunications, effort is
now put on added service features, loyalty to one company (“come home to AT&T”)
and low rates that can easily be understood. The focus is on marketing service to the
consumer, and the message is the company will take care o f the consumer, making their
life easier.
MFC has consistently shown itself to be concerned about its customers, by such
examples as; being responsive to service calls, offering free pilot lighting in the fall,
promoting low-income energy assistance programs, hiring and training staff to handle
large industrial and retail accounts individually and being a good corporate citizen in
the communities which it operates.

MFC can capitalize on the good name of the

company and its management’s known integrity, where a handshake is all it takes to
make a deal. This type o f company integrity is o f high value in the California market,
where MFC hopes to grow.
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In developing new markets in California (to be discussed further in the Opportunities
section) the company also can capitalize on the positive association with the state of
Montana. Californians have long been attracted to Montana, which has been a
marketing tool for company personnel now located in Los Angeles. In addition, the fact
that MPC has no nuclear power plants and is at least partially a hydro-based utility
(green energy) creates significant appeal to consumers in California. O f course, the
company’s ability to capitalize on MFC’s resource base changes with the sale o f MFC’s
generating assets.
MFC is to be applauded for hiring a non-utility marketing Vice-President. In 1997, W.
S. Dee, 57, was elected Vice President, Marketing. He had been employed previously as
policy teacher and consultant with Leo Burnett, Inc., an advertising agency, from 1993
to 1996. Also, he had served as Chief Executive Officer and owner of W. S. Dee Omega Beverages, a beverage manufacturing company, from 1991 to 1992. Mr Dee
brings a fresh, competitive perspective to the traditional MFC utility.
Finally, the energy trading floor environment, operational for over a year now and led
by senior management with expertise in oil and gas trading is a strength for MFC.
MPC Weaknesses
As previously mentioned, MFC’s relatively small operations and customer base, located
in the remote state of Montana, are a weakness. Unless IndeGO, the regional
transmission grid, is established, MFC will continue to face restricted access to the large
West Coast markets. This will occur because o f the pancaked transmission pricing
previously discussed, especially when attempting to transport electricity across BFA’s
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system. In addition, the power flow from Montana to the West Coast will be tied more
to the physical flow o f electricity across numerous systems, instead of the concept
discussed previously, where the system is like a lake (see the Transmission Intertie
section) and the actual movement of one company’s power through of the system is less
important than the replenishment of the “lake.”
Competing with BPA on price is another weakness for MPC. During high run-off years,
the BPA has enough hydro generating capacity to restrict the operations at Colstrip, due
to the inability o f MPC to economically dispatch the power plants. Since there is no
strong intertie into the Midwestern markets, MPC has no choice but to idle the plants
during these periods. This has occurred many times in the past several years, due to run
off conditions favoring BPA. Again, this is a weakness that will go away with the sale
of the generating assets. In fact, perhaps MPC will be able to negotiate a favorable
supply contract with BPA, instead o f trying to compete with them
While MPC has some parts o f the company with employees who have experience with
competition (telecommunications, coal, oil and gas and the energy trading floor), the
majority o f MPC’s 2,900 employees only have a utility background. These employees,
along with their managers and officers, will have to be coached to change their focus
and convinced that they cannot continue with business as usual.
Another weakness o f MPC is the centralized decision-making, where most decisions are
made in Butte, Montana. This is in contrast to an emerging competitor, the NUG
(previously identified as a Non-Utility Generator), where decisions and accountability
are pushed down to the operations level. MPC’s decision-making structure has created a
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disconnection between corporate and the operations, with little cross training between
the two.
While the skill set of trading floor can be accurately counted as a strength o f the
company, it also may be a weaknesses in that the depth and experience in this area may
not be good enough to compete with the Enron’s of the world.
From a financial perspective, MPC shows weakness from the lease obligation
associated with Colstrip 4. According to a Duff & Phelps credit rating report, ‘T)ebt to
capital is at an acceptable level; however, the lease obligation associated with Colstrip
Unit 4 creates an off-balance-sheet debt-like obligation. If the lease were on-balancesheet, it would weaken leverage significantly.”
Also, Duff & Phelps note that MPC has higher business risk than a regulated utility due
to its diversified businesses (coal, gas exploration and production, independent power,
telecommunications and energy trading) As a result MPC requires stronger financial
measures to offset the cash flow volatility associated with its diversified businesses.
Opportunities for MPC
Opportunities in the marketplace are many for MPC. A key opportunity comes from the
company’s approach to marketing its ability to “bundle” service for the customer, under
a one stop shopping approach. Examples of these services include billing, metering,
demand-side management, usage analysis, electric asset maintenance, power quality
expertise, not to mention the customer’s telecommunications needs.
The fact that MPC could offer these services was a key advantage that help land a
recent contract between MPC and the California Manufacturing Association (CMA).
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MPC was exclusively endorsed by the CMA to assist its members with their energy
decisions. MPC will provide comprehensive energy services, including energy supply
and energy management products and services to qualified CMA members. The CMA
has agreed to endorse and promote such products and services to its members. The
membership o f the CMA is the target market for MPC in California. The approximate
1,000 members of CMA represent an estimated 8 million megawatt hours of electric use
annually.
The fact that MPC is selling its generating resource base, that has been underutilized by
the native Montana load and hindered by unfair competition from BPA, is an
opportunity for the company to redeploy its assets into more productive ventures.
MPC has developed good relationships with most of its customers over the years
Residential customers know the company provides reliable service and is prompt to
restore power when there is an outage. As the marketing from “outside” companies
begins, MPC will be able to effectively counter the competition with an approach that
focuses on MPC being a Montana-based company with a continued commitment to its
customers. For the last several years, small commercial accounts have received
attention from MPC employees who are specially trained and specifically assigned to
that customer’s account. MPC’s relationship with large industrial accounts is not as
positive, mostly because of the higher pricing MPC has offered to these customers over
the past decade (the cross-subsidization issue discussed earlier).
MPC can use Tetragenics expertise to develop needed technology. Given Tetragenics’
expertise in developing dam monitoring devices, it seems a logical assumption that the
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technical skills developed by staff and management may be useful in applying the
emerging technology o f affordable time-of-use meters and analytical monitors.
Threats to MPC
The greatest external threat to MPC comes from timing. The saying ‘"timing is
everything” certainly is applicable in the electric energy market today. A new
marketplace is rapidly opening, and those first in the door will establish relationships
and secure contracts that will be lucrative and much harder to get two or three years
down the road. Companies must either be on the offense in the beginning or will be
defending their dwindling customer base in a short period o f time.
Therefore, MPC’s biggest threat comes from cherry-picking of large customers before
the company is ready to compete in a deregulated market. This can happen in many
ways: by not selling the company’s generating assets for at or near the asking price; by
not coming to a satisfactory resolution on the distribution o f the sale proceeds between
ratepayers and the company, and therefore staying tied up in MPSC hearings for a long
period of time; taking the anticipated two years to form IndeGO., if formed at all,
leaving MPC with pancaked transmission rates during the interim; or, intervention by
State officials trying to either stop the implementation of deregulation in the state or
gain control over the sale o f the generating assets.
Another main threat is that the best employees will be courted by other companies,
especially trading floor employees. Potential new employers are other companies
starting up a trading floor or other function related to deregulation, or existing
competitive companies who are gearing up for the expanding deregulated market. A
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good example of this is the recent departure of Frank Rotondi, President & CEO of the
MFC subsidiary charged with trading and marketing of electricity and gas. Mr. Rotondi
has been hired by Shell Oil, to head up the establishment of a trading floor. He leaves
behind a long career at MFC that recently led him to an officer position and the
opportunity to work on implementing deregulation.
Other threats MFC must resolve are the issues surrounding its out-of-market contracts.
These contracts involve not only sales o f electricity, but also the long-term coal contract
with HL&F, mentioned earlier. These contracts have vague clauses potentially allowing
repudiation if certain indexes are exceeded. One such index, on an energy sale contract
between MFC (seller) and another utility (buyer) is tied to market price, leaving the
door open for endless court battles over whether the company can force the buyer to
stay in a contract with out-of-market pricing. These types o f contractual disputes not
only detract management, they give MFC a bad reputation in the marketplace.
Another external force that threatens MFC’s success in deregulation is the MFSC. MFC
and the MFSC must quickly come to agreement on issues critical to the implementation
o f deregulation. Examples o f issues that must be resolved are how much money will be
refunded to the ratepayers if MFC sells off any o f its assets (as mentioned earlier); the
establishment o f an equitable contract price for electricity between MFC’s deregulated
Supply Division and regulated Energy Services Division, for those customers staying
with MFC after choice is available; the allowance of expenses associated with the new
corporate structure (especially for shared services between the new divisions).
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Finally, an external threat for any company today is a hostile takeover attempt. Hostile
takeovers are generally difficult in the utility world, since the distribution o f stock is
held among a widely dispersed population o f shareholders and there is a long wait for
regulatory approval. However, arbitrage investment opportunists that are active in the
marketplace today should not be ignored by MPC. The multiple state regulations in the
U.S. have created isolated and protected electricity markets, with a resulting wide
variation in prices. These variations set up arbitrage opportunities, where companies
like Louis Dreyfus come into the market and change traditional utility thinking about
energy deal-making. According to an article in Forbes, “Shortly after the 1992 Energy
Policy Act was passed, Louis Dreyfus Electric Power Inc. became one o f the first non
utilities to receive a license from FERC to market power. Permit in hand, Louis Dreyfus
made its first sale to San Diego Gas & Electric later that year, a one-year contract to
deliver 50 megawatts per hour at 2.5 cent per MWh, which was about 20% below
SDG&E’s cheapest alternative. As a principal in the transaction, Louis Dreyfus could
either commission a utility to generate the power or buy it from members of the WSPP.
Louis Dreyfus sold the power to SDG&E and then met its obligation by buying the
power from members o f the pool.”
The article goes on to say, “The deal took the industry by surprise. ‘The role o f the
merchant was very difficult for them to understand,’ says Paul Addis, a former grain
trader who helped steer Louis Dreyfus into electricity. ‘They didn’t see our
smokestacks, and they kept thinking there must be some trick.’ The trick was arbitrage.
Evening out prices by buying where it is cheap and selling where it is dear

Not only
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does arbitrage even out pricing, it takes advantage o f the opportunities created by
operating at less than optimal levels. When an arbitrager sees inefficiency, he/she goes
in and make it efficient. If MPC is not ran effectively and is not aggressive in its energy
trading activities, arbitrage companies like Louis Dreyfus could be considered a threat
to MPC
Exposure to Load Loss
How many customers are capable o f switching
MPC s electrical restructuring informational filing, filed with the MPSC in December
1996, stated MPC’s 269,000 residential customers must qualify to leave MPC’s system
under a load transition schedule. The schedule placed a cap on the number of kilowatt
hours, and hence customers, who could exit the system during the transition period.
According to the Informational Filing proposed Electric Tariff DMA-1 (see attached
Exhibit 7), the Residential Customer Choice Program would be limited to: 3,000
customers until June 30, 2000; 25,000 customers from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2002;
finally full power supply choice on July 1, 2002. This proposal was considered by most
to be a defensive strategy, designed to protect MPC fi*om competition for as long as
possible.
However, on July 2, 1997, after the passage of Montana’s new Electric Restructuring
and Customer Choice law, the company revised its transition schedule to speed up open
access for Montana consumers (see Changes in the Montana Regulatory and Legislative
Environment).
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This proposed 4-year transition plan, where all customers will have choice starting on
July 1, 2002, assumes the following; there will be adequate solutions for billing and
metering of small customers; reciprocity will be in place with neighboring states that
have opened their systems; and political problems are not overwhelming. If any o f
problems arise in these areas, the transition period will most likely be extended.
Stock and Financial Performance
This section will evaluate the stock and financial performance o f the seven utilities
considered being either competitors of MPC or potential merger/acquisition candidates.
These utilities are: PacifiCorp, Puget Sound Energy, Idaho Power, Washington Water
Power (WWP), Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Edison International. A detailed
description o f each company follows in the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates
section, along with an assessment of company strategies in relation to deregulation, and
how these strategies might blend or enhance MPC’s position in the marketplace.
Three key measurements will be defined, then analyzed, to assess companv valuation
(Price to Earnings ratio), management effectiveness (Return on Equity) and financial
strength (Debt to Equity ratio).
In addition. Exhibit 8 shows the stock performance of the seven companies over the
past five years. All companies, except PG&E, have experienced an upward trend in
stock prices, even though risk for the utility industry has significantly increased. The
trend in stock price is measured by the EMA, or exponential moving average over the
past 5 years. The EMA calculation takes the simple moving average (which is
calculated by adding the closing prices for the 20 quarters being analyzed and dividing
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by 20) and places more weight on recent prices by applying a percentage of the most
recent quarter’s closing price to the prior quarter’s moving average. Overall, stock
prices for all seven companies have trended up over the past two years, during each
company’s establishment of strategies to address deregulation.
All companies have outperformed the Dow Jones Western U.S. Electric Utilities Index
on annualized total return, except Puget Sound Energy and PG&E (see Exhibit 9):
Companv
MPC

5 Year Return*
12.73

PacifiCorp

9.28

Puget Sound Energy

6.90

Idaho Power

9.16

WWP

9.94

PG&E

5.64

Edison Intl.

9.54

Industry Index
7.96
Equity Market Index
22.81

* 5 year anmaUzed return (expressed in percent)
The increased risk for the utility industry (as measured by the Dow Jones Western U.S.
Electric Utilities Index vs. the Dow Jones Equity Market Index) shows the relatively
poor performance of the utility industry in the equity market over the past five years.
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with the western utility industry recording an annualized return of 7.96%, against an
annualized equity market index of 22.81%. Therefore, while stock values for the seven
companies are trending upward, charts showing the Five-Year Total Return for each
company, compared to the DJ Equity Market Index, are well below equity market
standards (see Exhibit 9).
Finally, Exhibits 10 and 11 provide December 31^ fiscal year end 1995, 1996 and 1997
comparative income statements, and fiscal year end 1996 and 1997 balance sheets.
Company Valuation
Ratios such as Price to Earnings, Price to Book and Price to Sales are measures o f the
value o f a company’s shares in the marketplace. Therefore, they are a general indication
of the company’s value in the marketplace, via the stock price on a given date. For
purposes o f this paper, the Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio is used as the measuring tool to
determine company valuation for the seven utilities.
Price to Earnings Ratio
The P/E ratio shows the amount investors are willing to pay for each dollar o f corporate
earnings. The calculation used in Exhibit 12 was made by dividing the closing stock
price on March 31, 1998 by the sum o f the trailing four quarters of EPS (earnings per
share). The industry average P/E ratio of 16.30 is based on a comparison against the
Dow Jones Western U.S. Electric Utility index.
Management Effectiveness
Financial ratios, such as return on assets and return on equity, evaluate management’s
effectiveness by looking at the organization’s operating success and failure through an
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accounting period and associating the income earned with the amount of resources
utilized. Return on equity (ROE) will be analyzed to determine management
effectiveness.
Return on Equity
ROE is a measure of the company’s profitability, as expressed in a percentage. Exhibit
13 shows the calculation for each company, based on the trailing four quarters o f net
income (fi’om total operations) divided by the common equity figure fi*om the March
1997 10-Q filing.
Financial Strength
The financial strength o f a company is typically determined by evaluating company
solvency For this reason, debt capacity ratios are used to judge solvency. These ratios
are o f primary importance to long-term creditors who have an obvious concern
regarding the receipt of interest and the repayment of amounts borrowed. Debt ratios, in
general, reveal the effect of financial leverage or the solvency o f the company. The debt
to equity ratio will be used to evaluate financial strength of the seven companies.
Debt to Equity Ratio
The Debt to Equity ratio measures a company’s financial strength by evaluating debt
capacity and utilization. It is an expression of the relationship between financial
resources provided from creditors and those provided by equity owners, measuring the
relative risk assumed by each class of provider and the degree of protection provided by
equity owners for creditors. The Debt to Equity ratios in Exhibit 14 are calculated by
taking long-term debt divided by common equity fi^om the March 31, 1998 10-Q filings.
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Besides the three financial measures mentioned above, it is worth noting that all seven
utilities have included a discussion in their fiscal year end 12/31/97 annual reports on
the potential impact if the utility operations are required to apply FASB Statement No.
101 - ‘‘Regulated Enterprises - Accounting for the Discontinuation o f Application of
FASB NO 71"
Statement No. 71 requires the Company to defer certain costs that would otherwise be
charged to expense, if it is probable that future rates will permit recovery of such costs.
These costs create what is known as regulatory assets. Accounting for regulatory assets
under Statement No. 71 is appropriate as long as: rates are established by or subject to
approval by independent, third-party regulators; rates are designed to recover the
specific enterprise's cost-of-service; in view of demand for service, it is reasonable to
assume that rates set at levels that will recover costs can be charged to and collected
fi*om customers.

Adoption of Statement No. 101 would require the write-off of

regulatory assets and liabilities related to those operations not meeting Statement No.
71, highlighting the increased shareholder and creditor risk in the utility industry as a
whole.
Analysis of the P/E ratio, ROE, and debt to equity ratio mentioned above, for MFC and
the six utilities considered as merger or acquisition candidates, is as follows:
MFC
P/E ratio
As Exhibit 12 shows, MPC’s shareholders are slightly more willing (then the
typical utility stockholder) to pay for corporate earnings, with a P/E ratio of
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17.60. This ratio has been driven down in the last two quarters, via strong
financial performance in the 4^ quarter 1997, where EPS shot from $.28/share
the previous quarter to $.93/share at 12/31/97, without an equal increase in stock
price. This effect was countered by an unusually high stock price at 3/31/98,
which boosted MPC’s P/E ratio.
It is reasonable to assume that MPC will continue to outperform the industry on
the P/E ratio, due to the diversity o f the company (telecommunications, oil &
gas, energy trading, etc.) and the sale o f generation assets, both viewed as
positive by stock market analysts.
Stock prices for the past several years has ranged around $20/share. However,
the stock prices in the past year have significantly outperformed market
expectation, with a 52-week high of $38.50 (see Exhibit 8). Speculation has
credited the jump with the settlement of long-disputed contracts with Puget
Sound Energy, along with the proposed sale of the company’s generating assets
and the company’s strategy to grow in telecommunications.
Return on Equity
MPC’s 11.5% ROE is virtually the same as the industry average of 11.6%,
indicating acceptable profitability for the common equity investment employed.
An evaluation of the consolidated net income EPS shows a shift over the past
three years away from utility operations, toward non-utility earnings. This is
most likely indicative o f the coming years, given deregulation and the expected
growth of the telecommunications division:
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1997

1996

1995

Utility Operations

$1.08

$1.13

$1.22

Non-utility Operations

$1.21

$0.90

$(.30)

Consolidated Net Income

$2.29

$2.03

$0.90

Debt to Equity ratio
At a .65 debt to equity ratio, MPC is at only 46.8% of the industry average o f
1.39. This indicates that the company is leveraged significantly less than other
companies in the industry and would be in a position to either acquire additional
assets through debt financing or raise significant cash if the need arose. This
ratio could decrease even further with the sale o f the company’s generating
assets, assuming the company would pay off some existing debt with the
proceeds.
However, one adjustment that needs to be considered when evaluating MFC’s
debt to equity ratio is the off balance sheet long term lease obligation with
Colstrip Unit #4. If this obligation were on the balance sheet, it would weaken
the company’s leverage significantly.^^
In summary, MFC is currently in a stable financial position. The F/E ratio and
ROE indicate that the company’s effort to embrace deregulation, an admittedly
riskier line of business, has been received favorably by the investment
community. Stock performance, in particular over the past two years, has been
very strong. The financial outlook is positive for the company. However, as
mentioned above, the Debt to Equity ratio is actually higher than it appears on
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the balance sheet, due to the off balance sheet lease obligation with Colstrip #4.
Analysts caution that this item would significantly weaken MPC’s leverage if it
were on the balance sheet.
PacifiCorp
P/E ratio
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio is being driven down by the volatility o f the company.
This volatility is brought on by the attempted acquisition of the Energy Group,
the largest electric utility in England. The effects of this attempted acquisition
are discussed in more detail in the following Potential Merger/Acquisition
Candidates section.
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio was negatively impacted by a 4^ quarter sell-off o f
several subsidiaries, namely Pacific Telcom on December 1, 1997; Pacific
Generation on November 5, 1997 and TPC (the gas gathering and processing
subsidiary) on December

1,

1997, which raised

earnings without

a

corresponding increase in stock price.
In 1997, PacifiCorp generated $1.8 billion in cash (excluding $370 million in
income tax liability) from the sale of assets with a carrying value of $822
million. The primary contributor to the $454 million in income from
discontinued operations in 1997 was the sale o f Pacific Telcom, with a net gain
o f $365 million.
The sale of these assets had a significant effect on the 4-quarter EPS average.
Quarter ending

EPS
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June 30, 1997

$.30

Sept. 30, 1997

$ .23

Dec. 31,1997

$1.29

Mar. 31, 1998

($.07)

PacifiCorp’s net income from continuing operations decreased 49% to $205.4
million in the 4^ quarter 1997 This continued dismal performance is also
revealed in the first quarter 1998 EPS figure. Performance from continuing
operations will continue to be lower than industry averages, until the merger
issued is settled.
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio can be expected to improve significantly once the 4^
quarter 1997 boost from asset sales is removed from the calculation, assuming
the stock market will still be willing to pay $23-$26 per share. Stock prices
continue to show an upward trend over the past five years (see Exhibit 8),
despite a recent drop from $24+/share in 4^ quarter 1997 to $22/share in 2"^
quarter 1998.
Return on Equity
PacifiCorp’s current 12.8% ROE is being shored up by the sell-ofF o f assets,
previously mentioned Taking away the 4* quarter 1997 $454 million in net
income from discontinued operations would decrease the 1997 ROE to 4.3%,
approximately 1/3 of the industry average o f 11.6%. PacifiCorp shareholders
may be gambling that poor short-term performance will pay off by positioning
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the company as a leading global distributor and merchant energy company, thus
providing a long-term ROE that will outperform the industry.
Debt to Equity ratio
PacifiCorp’s Debt to Equity ratio at 12/31/97 was 1.04, measured against an
industry average o f 1.39. The effects o f the company’s attempted acquisition of
Energy Group is not yet showing on the balance sheet. However, credit rating
companies are cautioning that the proposed $3.8 billion in assumed debt and
lease obligation associated with the acquisition will materially increase
consolidated debt leverage and weaken credit protection measures.
In summary, PacifiCorp’s attempted acquisition o f Energy Group has, at least on
a short-term basis, harmed the financial position of the company However,
shareholders seem to be willing to tolerate the low financial performance for the
now.
Puget Sound Energy
P/E ratio
Puget’s P/E ratio is slightly below industry average, at 15.70. This ratio shows
high potential for improvement, assuming Puget has placed itself in a strategic
growth position with the February 1997 merger of Washington Energy
Company and its subsidiary Washington Natural Gas Company. The merger
called for each share o f Washington stock to be exchanged for .86 share of
Puget. At the merger date, holders o f Puget’s and Washington’s common stock
held approximately 75% and 25% respectively, of the aggregate number of
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outstanding shares o f the merged company’s common stock. Additional stock
price growth potential comes from the April 1998 energy-marketing and trading
agreement between Puget and Duke Energy, which is discussed in more detail in
the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates section. Analysts should view both
the acquisition and marketing agreement favorably, giving the potential for an
improved stock price and P/E ratio.
The P/E ratio is positively effected by 1997 net income from continued
operations, which fell 25% to $108.4 million (although revenues rose 2% to
$1.68 billion) without a corresponding decrease in stock price. Part of the net
income decline is due to $55.8 million in merger-related costs and the buyout of
several expensive gas purchase contracts, both non-reoccurring expenses that the
stock market has not penalized. Another positive effect on the P/E ratio results
from stock prices being strong over the past year, with a continued growth trend
expected (see Exhibit 8).
Return on Equity
Puget, as with MPC, is at 99.1% o f the industry average ROE, recording 11.5%
at fiscal year end 12/31/97. Prospects for future improvement of ROE are good,
with the one-time merger and gas contract buyout costs already absorbed and the
Washington Energy merger and Duke Energy marketing agreement in place for
the friture.
Debt to Equity ratio
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As with MPC and PacifiCorp, Puget’s debt to equity ratio is below industry
average, at 1.01. Further, a review o f Puget’s balance sheet over the last two
years shows that the debt to equity ratio has remained consistently below
industry average. The company should be able to leverage its relatively low debt
position, if additional mergers or acquisition possibilities are pursued
In summary, Puget, like MPC, is financially sound and is viewed positively by
the market. Ratios indicate the company is stable and could continue to acquire
or merge if such action was consistent with the company’s strategy.
Idaho Power
P/E ratio
Idaho Power also has a P/E ratio slightly below industry average, at 15.20. BPS
has remained relatively stable over the preceding four quarters, as has the stock
price.
Idaho is a very stable company, with little fluctuation in net income over the
prior three years. Stock prices have grown significantly since 1994, from a low
o f $23+/share to a June 1998 price o f $34+/share (see Exhibit 8).
The prospects for Idaho are positive, with investments in solar energy and
increased sales from new activity in the wholesale trading market. In fiscal year
1997, revenues rose 29% to $748.5 million, primarily from the new trading
activity focus of the company.
The prospects for Idaho’s P/E ratio should be good, with continued growth in
trading and the development of new solar technology (discussed in more detail
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in the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates section) fueling a steady climb
in the stock price.
Return on Equity
Idaho’s ROE climbed to 109% above the industry average at 12.70% at March
31, 1998. The higher than industry performance over the past two years was
fueled b y a l * quarter 1998 net income o f $29.5 million, up $9 million over the
previous quarter. First quarter revenues increased by $21 million, mostly in new
trading revenues, with only an $8 million increase in associated operation
expenses. The company is not infusing additional equity at this time The
prospects for continued growth in energy trading revenues is high, thus the ROE
should continue an upward trend.
Debt to Equity ratio
Like the other utilities analyzed so far, Idaho has a low debt to equity ratio At
1.04, the ratio is 75% o f the industry average of 1.39. There has been little
fluctuation in company’s debt load over the past two years. The under-utilization
o f leverage could allow Idaho to secure additional debt, to perhaps grow its new
solar technology investments or develop new energy efficiency technologies.
Idaho’s

growth

potential

will

be

discussed

more

in

the

Potential

Merger/Acquisition Candidates section.
In summary, all indicators point to a healthy, growing Idaho Power. The
company has the capacity to raise additional capital for new technology
development, if it chooses. The revenue stream shows good promise, from
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increased trading activities. Stock prices should continue to climb, as the
company develops new solar technology while taking a defensive strategy
toward deregulation (which is discussed in more detail in the next section).
Washington Water Power
P/E ratio
WWP has the poorest P/E ratio performance o f the seven utilities analyzed, with
a ratio of 10.90. One possible reason WWP cannot attract more money for its
stock is the volatility o f the EPS over the past two years. EPS has ranged from
$. 12/share in June 1996 to $.83/share in June 1997. Fiscal year 1997 revenues
rose 38% to $1.30 billion, while net income applicable to common rose 45% to
$109.4 million. The revenues reflect higher transmission revenues due to
increased wholesale electric sales.
WWP is considered a conservative company, with modest growth predictions
and a stand against deregulation. In a time of market uncertainty, being
conservative may be penalized. This is perhaps another reason the P/E ratio is
held below industry average.
Return on Equity
Conversely, WWP’s ROE outperforms the industry with a return o f 15.4%,
132.8% o f the industry average. Coupled with the P/E ratio, there is an
indication that recent higher than average earnings for WWP have driven both
ratios (increasing the P/E denominator and ROE numerator without a
corresponding increase in stock or equity over the short term).
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Looking at WWP’s net income from operations for the past several years shows
that 1997 earnings were 38% higher than 1996. Some of this improvement
comes from two new unregulated energy and marketing service subsidiaries Advantage, Inc. and Avista Energy Inc.. More than likely, the market has not
had enough time, or not enough inclination, to move the stock price up more
than from approximately 19+/share in 1996 to $22+/share in 1998. For the
future, WWP’s ROE should moderate if the company continues to record
earnings at the 1997 level.
Debt to Equity ratio
Finally, WWP’s debt to equity ratio is below industry average, at a ratio of .96.
As mentioned with the previous utilities that have below average debt to equity
ratios, WWP has the capability to secure funding, if the company chooses to
grow through a strategic acquisition or development o f an existing business
segment.
In summary, WWP is a conservative company that does not achieve the stock
price its recent performance warrants. However, the two new subsidiaries
mentioned above, while inherently riskier, may provide adequate growth to
warrant better stock prices for the company. The company does has debt
capacity to grow.
PG&E
P/E ratio
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PG&E has the strongest P/E ratio o f the seven utilities analyzed, at 19.90. The
company has been able to hold or increase its stock price over the past four
quarters, even with volatile EPS’s that range from $.62/share in September 1997
to $.22/share in December 1997. For fiscal year 1997, revenues rose 60% to
$15.4 billion. Net income fell 1% to $716 million. Revenues reflect a $4.52
billion rise in unregulated energy commodities and services revenue due to
recent acquisitions. Earnings lagged due to low margins on unregulated activity
and higher depreciation. The lower earnings, without a corresponding drop in
stock price, has (perhaps temporarily) boosted the P/E ratio.
Stock prices have held above $29/share for the last three quarters, but are
significantly below the $35+/share price from five years ago (see Exhibit 8).
As mentioned in detail later, PG&E is divesting itself o f its electric generation
plants in Northern California and is aggressively growing its electric and
information management services and its environmentally-friendly electric
supply options. The stock market is responding favorably to PG&E’s strategy to
grow into a national energy company, as indicated by their strong P/E ratio and
improved stock performance this past year.
Return on Equity
PG&E’s ROE is not as impressive as its P/E ratio, with a ROE at 8.7%, which is
75.7% of the industry average. The major influence on PG&E’s March 31, 1998
ROE is the dismal performance in the 4^ quarter 1997 Operating revenues
declined because of a 10 percent electric rate reduction provided to residential
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and small commercial customers and due to changes in regulatory adjustment
mechanisms resulting from electric industry restructuring.

Both o f these

changes drove earnings and ROE down. During the last quarter o f 1997, the
electric rate reduction decreased operating revenues by approximately $100
million
Debt to Equity ratio
PG&E is leveraged at approximately the industry average, with a debt to equity
ratio o f 1.32, compared to the industry average o f 1.39. This ratio has gone up
significantly in the past year, after PG&E bought a portfolio of electric
generating assets and power supply contracts from the New England Electric
System (NEES) for $1.59 billion. Financing requirements totaled approximately
$1.75 billion, of which approximately $1.25 billion were funded through debt.
However, plans are underway for PG&E to sell off its non-nuclear generating
facilities in California, which will free up significant amounts of cash, most
likely lowering the debt to equity ratio, positioning PG&E to make further debtfunded acquisitions, if it chooses to do so in the future.
In summary, PG&E is in a transition period that is reflecting in a slightly
negative way on its income statement. A rate reduction order in the core market
has squeezed utility revenues. New business is just beginning to form, as
discussed in the next section. The net income over the past five years has
declined from a high of $1.34 billion to $716 million in 1997. Also, PG&E’s
total return performance has lagged slightly behind the annualized industry
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growth index for the same time period. These are all indications that PG&E
needs to be successful in their new ventures in order to maintain its strong P/E
ratio and continue growing the company’s value in the stock market.
Edison International
P/E ratio
Edison’s P/E ratio is the closest to industry average, at 16.90. The company
responded to new competition by selling several o f its generating plants and
investing in new technology associated with the electric-vehicle market. Current
earnings are being pressed downward by the accelerated depreciation of
Edison’s nuclear investments and the termination costs associated with its
above-market fixed-rate QF purchased power contracts. The company will
benefit in the long term from these write-offs, which should continue to boost
the stock price as well as the EPS. Edison’s stock price has done very well in the
past three years (see Exhibit 8).
Another factor effecting the P/E ratio is outstanding stock, which has fallen from
440 million shares in June 1996 to 366 million in March 1998, through a stock
repurchase plan.

The company intends to continue the repurchase of stock,

which will likewise continue to lower the P/E ratio. However, stock analysts will
more than likely view the company positively, compensating for the pressure
from the stock repurchase program.
Return on Equity
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Edison’s ROE is at 13.1%, compared to the industry average of 11.6%. Again,
as with the P/E ratio, Edison’s stock repurchase program will effect the ROE
calculation, by decreasing the denominator and therefore increasing the ROE
As previously discussed in Branding Utility Products section, the company is
poising itself for competition, through the development o f the electric vehicle
market and other non-utility ventures. These investments, through the utilization
o f cash generated by the sale of power plants in California, should allow the
ROE to stay above industry average for the foreseeable future, assuming the
new ventures generate more net income than the generating station investments
Given that today power sells cheaper on the open market than it can be produced
from a traditional generating station, the assumption that the new investments
should generate more return should be correct.
Debt to Equity ratio
Finally, Edison’s debt to equity is 1.66, or 119.4% of industry average. Again,
the repurchase of stock will effect this measure, in a negative way, by lowering
the proportion o f equity to debt. In addition to shrinking equity, Edison also
increased long-term debt by over $1.3 billion from 1996 to 1997. This increase
was driven by the issuance o f $2.5 billion in rate reduction notes in December
1997, prompted by the move to deregulation in California and the attempt by
Edison to remain whole during the transition period. The rate reduction notes
reflect the Edison’s right to be paid a specified amount from a non-bypassable
tariff levied on residential and small commercial customers (i.e. transition
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costs). Edison used the proceeds from the note sales to retire debt and equity
securities.
In summary, Edison is a strong company, with an accepted growth strategy and
diversification in non-utility arenas. Earnings per share and net income are
strong, as indicated by above average price to earnings and return on equity
measures Stock prices have continued to climb over the past two years,
doubling from a low of $15/share in June 1996 to $30 1/2/share in April 1998
(see Exhibit 8). Capitalizing on the company’s right to collect transition costs,
by issuing $2.5 billion in rate reduction notes, has jumped the company’s debt,
but not to unacceptable levels.

Summary
This section has recapped the stock and financial performance o f the seven utilities
being evaluated by measuring stock performance, company valuation, management
effectiveness and financial strength. In addition, each utility and the western U.S. utility
industry were evaluated against the Dow Jones equity market for five-year total return.
While all companies are attempting to grow their enterprises through non-utility
activities, some are proving more successful, with less risk. MPC, Puget and Edison
Intl. are strong companies, with acceptable financial measures and strategies to
diversify into non-utility businesses. PG&E has lost ground in the past several years, as
its core market has eroded and rate reduction measures have taken a toll on operating
revenues. Idaho Power and WWP are conservative companies, which do not embrace
deregulation. Idaho’s performance in the stock market has been better than WWP’s,
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most likely due to the potential for development of its solar energy technology.
PacifiCorp may ultimately be successful in growing shareholder value through the
acquisition o f Energy Group, but its current financial condition is jeopardized by this
activity.
The next section will discuss each of the seven companies in more detail.
Potential Merger Candidates/Competitors
The following companies were chosen as potential merger candidates or direct
competitors o f MPC, based on either geographic proximity to MPC; a prior relationship
with MPC; or by an industry analyst selection. Specifically, PacifiCorp, Puget Sound
Energy, PG&E and WWP are partners in the Colstrip power plants. Idaho Power is a
geographic neighbor to MPC Finally, PG&E and Edison Intl. are listed as top
competitors of MPC by the Hoovers On-line internet service.
This section will describe each competitor, its strategy and how that strategy may fit
with MPC
PacifiCorp
PacifiCorp, one of the lowest-cost electricity producers in the United States, is a
multinational energy company with 1.4 million retail electric customers in the western
United States and 550,000 customers in the State of Victoria, Australia. PacifiCorp,
which has more than 10,000 megawatts o f generation capacity, also is the largest
investor-owned bulk power marketer in the western U.S. and is an active electricity and
gas marketer in the eastern U.S.. The company’s strategy is to focus on utility
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operations and therefore is selling its natural gas pipeline and processing systems and
some o f its generation units.
PacifiCorp has a foreign growth strategy that includes acquiring the largest electric
utility in England, Energy Group. The attempted acquisition of Energy Group, the
parent company o f Eastern Electricity PLC and Peabody Coal, has been stalled by a
rival bid from Texas Utilities. PacifiCorp’s latest bid is for $6.6 billion in cash and $4.1
billion in assumed debt and lease obligations. PacifiCorp plans to fund the acquisition
largely with debt and the sale of non-core assets. According to a Duff & Phelps report,
the new debt will materially increase the company’s consolidated debt leverage and
weaken credit protection measures. Therefore, the ratings for PacifiCorp bonds have
been downgraded and are on a rating watch.^*
A merger with or (more likely) acquisition o f MPC by PacifiCorp would not make
sense at this time, if PacifiCorp is successful in the acquisition of Energy Group. The
company will presumably not be in a position to merge or acquire any other companies
in the foreseeable future, given the debt load assumed. In addition, PacifiCorp is
seeking to grow in the international market, becoming a leading global distribution and
merchant energy company that creates operating synergies, with a diversified
geographic presence in the U.S., Australia and England. There is little in this strategy to
support the blending of MPC and PacifiCorp through acquisition or merger, except the
two areas mentioned below, which most likely would not be compelling enough to
argue for consolidation o f the two companies:

106

•

One area o f possible merger consideration is MFC’s non-regulated energy company,
CES, which has ownership and operating interests in several power projects in the
United Kingdom. Depending on the needs o f the combined PacifiCorp/Energy
Group, these projects could prove useful as energy resources or operating expertise.

•

Another consideration is the potential for a coal operation merger between
PacifiCorp and MPC. Assuming PacifiCorp is successful with the Energy Group
acquisition, Peabody Coal will become part of the corporation. Peabody is the
world’s largest private producer of coal. If PacifiCorp intends to grow its coal
operations, a merger with MFC’s coal holdings, listed as one of the top ten
producers in the U.S., would make sense.

However, as previously mentioned, it is unlikely either company would seek a merger
or acquisition.
Puget Sound Energy
Puget seeks to build on the strengths of its efficient electric distribution and
transmission system to become a leading provider of energy and related services to
homes and businesses in the Pacific Northwest. To prepare for a more competitive
business environment, Puget has committed itself to being a low cost supplier of
electricity, by reducing costs, work force reductions, facility consolidations and
reductions in capital budgets. Puget intends to pursue opportunities for improved
operating efficiencies and productivity, including possible restructuring of its power
supply resources and contracts.

107

Generation owned by Puget includes a 50/50 ownership with Montana Power of the
twin-333 megawatt (MW) Colstrip Units 1&2 and a 25% interest in the twin-805 MW
Colstrip Units 3 & 4. In addition, Puget purchases 94 MW from MPC’s leased-back
interest in Colstrip Unit 4. Besides the interest in the Colstrip plants, Puget owns little
generation, instead meeting electrical demand through purchase power contracts
In addition to its electrical operations, Puget is now the largest gas utility in the Pacific
Northwest. The company achieved this status (as mentioned earlier) by acquiring
Washington Energy Company and its subsidiary Washington Natural Gas Company in
February 1997. Besides its own production, the company purchases a blended portfolio
of long-term firm, short-term firm, and spot gas supplies from major and independent
producers and gas marketers in the U.S. and Canada.
Also, Puget is actively pursuing opportunities to become a provider of new high value
services such as wireless automated meter-based services and geographic information
systems to utility customers and other utilities.
A recent development is the announced agreement between Puget and Duke Energy
Trading and Marketing of Houston, Texas. The two companies have agreed to
coordinate their energy-marketing and trading activities in 14 western states and British
Columbia. Based in Salt Lake City, the combined energy trading activities of the two
companies will focus on power marketing and trading business in the WSCC region.
According to Duke, “Puget’s power-asset position in energy trading and its expertise in
this region will bolster our operations. The new capabilities created by this expanded
relationship effectively integrates with the power plants Duke Energy is purchasing
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from Pacific Gas & E l e c t r i c . T h r o u g h this new relationship, Puget will now
participate in an energy-trading business many times the size of its former trading
activities.
How this partnership will effect a potential merger with or acquisition o f MPC depends
on whether Duke and Puget would see advantages to further expanding a combined
presence in the region and whether MPC s trading floor expertise is seen as a valued
asset.
A merger or acquisition between MPC and Puget would have made more sense before
the decision by MPC to sell off its generating assets. The growing customer base in the
Pacific Northwest (the fastest growing region in the nation), coupled with the
generating assets o f MPC, would have created a company o f significant size, with
diverse electric generating resources (both purchased and owned).
Merging the two companies could still make sense from an energy services standpoint,
to gain economies of scale and efficiencies (consolidating administrative functions,
energy trading activities, etc.) and gaining some seasonal load variations between
Montana and the West Coast. Also worth considering is the experience these two
companies have with each other, via the common ownership at Colstrip. Each company
knows the other’s corporate culture and can assess the ability to blend the two
companies In addition, Puget and MPC have worked together recently to resolve
longstanding contractual disputes over Puget’s Colstrip Unit 4 purchase power contract
and the coal contract pricing between Western Energy and the Colstrip units. These
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settlements clear the way for a more harmonious relationship between the two
companies.
Finally, a consolidation is viable when considering other parts of the two companies
from a strategic point of view. One such area could be the combining o f MPC’s and
Puget’s gas operations. As stated earlier, Puget is the largest gas utility in the Pacific
Northwest, with large owned gas supplies and purchased gas contracts. MPC, which
also has its own production and storage fields, could combine with Puget to capitalize
on the spot market by increasing production when market prices are high and inject its
production into storage when market prices are low, saving the gas for the future. This
would cushion both MPC’s and Puget’s exposure to market volatility, in addition to
giving MPC a much larger market to sell into on the West Coast.
Given MPC’s expansion plans in its oil and gas operations, evidenced by the $56
million acquisition exploration and development budget for 1998, and its expertise in
oil and gas trading, it appears MPC is positioning itself to be a bigger player in Western
U.S. gas operations. Puget and MPC together may make a lot of sense from a gas utility
standpoint and from the desire of both companies to develop or utilize new technologies
to serve the customer, via either telecommunications or technological advances in
metering, geographic information systems, or other technology-based advances Finally,
MPC’s fiber optic reach into Seattle and Puget’s large customer base become a natural
fit for Puget and MPC’s telecommunications arm.
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With MPC being approximately 60% of the size of Puget, it would make sense for
Puget to pursue an acquisition of MPC, if a consolidation were to occur. Or, both
companies could agree to a merger. It is unlikely that MPC would acquire Puget.
Idaho Power
Idaho Power Company is an electric utility engaged in the generation, purchase,
transmission, distribution and sale of electric energy in an approximate 20,000-squaremile area in southern Idaho, eastern Oregon and northern Nevada, with an estimated
population o f 754,000 people. The company's results of operations, like those of other
utilities in the Northwest, can be significantly affected by changing weather,
precipitation and streamflow conditions. Idaho Power relies heavily on hydroelectric
power for its generating needs and is one o f the nation's few investor-owned utilities
with a predominantly hydro base
Idaho Power describes itself as the country’s leader in photovoltaic (solar) research and
project implementation, with a subsidiary. Applied Power Corporation (APC) being
North America’s most experienced photovoltaic system provider. Idaho Power
Resources Corporation (IPRC), another subsidiary, focuses on exploring renewable
energy technology, infrastructure development, and the related opportunities associated
with communications technology and energy efficiency. Idaho Power’s strategy is to
maintain its existing resource base, continue to expand and eventually commercialize its
solar technology and approach deregulation with a defensive strategy, as discussed in a
February 26, 1998 letter withdrawing its participation in IndeGO. According to Kip W.
Runyan, Vice President of Delivery for Idaho Power, “The State of Idaho is facing the
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prospects of electric industry restructuring and retail competition with considerable
apprehension. Idaho electric rates are already among the lowest in the country and many
people are concerned that restructuring will only bring higher prices and more problems
to our state. This is the subject of current debate in both regulatory and legislative
reforms with our state. We do not believe it to be appropriate for Idaho Power to take
what would be perceived as a major step down the road to restructuring prior to the
conclusion o f this debate.”^®
With this stance, it is unlikely Idaho Power would be interested in a merger with MPC,
which embraces deregulation. Given that Idaho Power and MPC are approximately of
equal size, it is possible that MPC could utilize the cash generated by the sale o f its
generating assets, as well as its under-utilized debt capacity, to acquire Idaho Power.
But this move would not be consistent with MPC’s strategy to grow in the California
markets. In addition, while both companies express an interest in growing through new
technology, Idaho’s solar technology and MPC’s telecommunications technology
development do not create any natural synergies. Therefore, it is unlikely, MPC and
Idaho would consolidate
W ashington W ater Power
The Washington Water Power Company (WWP) operates in the electric and natural gas
utility businesses. The company employs 1,467 people in its utility operations and
approximately 1,751 people in its majority-owned non-regulated businesses (energy and
non-energy). WWP provides electricity and natural gas distribution and transmission
services in a 26,000 square mile area in eastern Washington and Northern Idaho with a
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population o f approximately 825,000 and also provides natural gas service in a 4,000
square mile area in northeast and southwest Oregon and in the South Lake Tahoe region
o f California, with the population in these areas approximating 495,000. WWP’s
corporate headquarters are in Spokane, Washington, which serves as the Inland
Northwest's

center

for

manufacturing,

transportation,

health

care,

education,

communication, agricultural and service businesses.
Since 1996, WWP has reorganized its operations and purports to take advantage of the
changes in the business environment and to proactively respond to regulatory and
structural changes in the industry. Although WWP states that the restructuring
reinforces a commitment to and advocacy of utility industry deregulation, the decision
to withdraw from the FERC filing creating IndeGO indicates the company is taking a
defensive strategy towards deregulation. The reason for the withdrawal from IndeGO is
amplified by the 4 diagrams o f electric rates in the U.S. (see Exhibit 15). WWP’s retail
rates are among the lowest in the nation. Therefore, the company has little incentive to
embrace deregulation.
According to Standard & Poor’s evaluation of WWP, “the company has an above
average business profile along with an adequate financial profile. The strong business
position reflects WWP’s low-risk hydroelectric operations, very competitive electric
rates, and minimal rate needs Financial parameters are expected to modestly improve,
given the company’s manageable capital program and annual electric retail sales
growth, projected at about 1.7%. These factors should allow the cash flow interest
coverage to stay around 3.5 times and funds from operations to average total debt to
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approximately 20%.”"^^ However, S&P cautions that WWP’s new energy services and
energy marketing arms are of increasing concern given their inherently riskier business
profiles. Overall, WWP’s outlook is stable. As previously mentioned, the P/E ratio may
be adversely affected by the conservative stand on deregulation, in spite of the positive
comments by industry analysts.
As with Idaho Power, a strategy to consolidate MPC with WWP would not make sense
at this time, because of WWP’s and MPC’s opposite responses to deregulation. WWP
withdrew its support of IndeGO for the same reason as Idaho Power, to protect some of
the lowest utility rates in the nation. While MPC may be interested in securing low-cost
generation to grow its market share in California, it is unlikely the company would want
to sell off its own generating facilities, then turn around and purchase basically the same
asset base in a company approximately the same size as MPC
Pacific Gas & Electric
PG&E is the nation’s second largest publicly owned electric and gas utility. It serves
almost 4.5 million electric customers and 3.7 million gas customers in Northern and
Central California. Because of deregulation, the company is moving away from being a
power supplier and toward being a power and gas distributor. Therefore, PG&E is
divesting itself o f its fossil-fuel power plants. Also, as previously mentioned, PG&E is
promoting the Clean Choice line o f environmentally-friendly electric supply options,
which will correspond with the sale o f its fbssil-fuel power plants.
MPC is considered by some analysts to be a direct competitor of PG&E in the
California markets."*^ This is probably due to MPC’s aggressive marketing plan in
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PG&E’s traditional service territory. However, it seems unlikely that MFC would prove
a real threat to PG&E, given the difference in size between the two companies (PG&E
is approximately 11 times the size of MPC) and PG&E’s already successful efforts of
its marketing arm, PG&E Energy Services.
PG&E Energy Services has won several major energy supplier contracts in California.
To date. Energy Services has entered into long-term power agreements that in total
represent more than $1 billion in revenue and has opened offices in Atlanta, Baltimore,
Bethesda, Boulder, Charlotte, Chicago, Columbia, S C , Houston, Little Rock, Costa
Mesa, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Jose,
Stockton and Tulsa. Testimonials state that Energy Services is a successful bidder
because of guaranteed energy savings, long-term solutions based on the specific needs
o f the customer, and the ability to provide comprehensive billing and information
management services. PG&E recently announced that it had entered into a landmark
agreement with Safeway, Inc. to provide electricity and energy information
management to all 400 Safeway and Von supermarkets, major office complexes, and 12
support facilities throughout California.
There’s little support for a merger or acquisition between PG&E and MPC, with
PG&E’s strategy to become a nationwide power and gas distributor. There is not
enough consumer base in Montana to justify the investment, nor enough gas distribution
capacity.
Edison International
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Edison International is the parent company of Southern Cal Edison, the #2 US electric
utility in number o f customers (4.2 million). SCE has responded to competition by
selling several of its power plants and investing in subsidiaries that are in nontraditional arenas. The company supports new technology in California by supplying
charging equipment for the electric-vehicle market in the state and is divested into
unrelated fields such as public housing, industrial parks and financing companies.
Edison Capital, an investment subsidiary, is a provider o f capital and financial services
for energy and infrastructure projects domestically and abroad. Its investments include
interests in nuclear power, cogeneration, electric transmission, waste-to-energy,
hydroelectric, transportation, telecommunications, and affordable housing facilities.
Edison is diversified in many arenas, besides those mentioned above.
In addition, Edison is striving to develop creative solutions to energy needs by building
strategic alliances. Edison EV, a subsidiary, is engaged in the business of providing
services related to electric vehicles, including the distribution and installation of electric
vehicle charging equipment. Edison EV has supplemented its existing alliances with
General Motors and Saturn Corporation by forming ties to American Honda Motor
Company, Toyota Motor Sales, Ford Motor Company, and to additional electric vehicle
charging manufacturers, to serve electric vehicle customers nationwide.'*^
Edison International is also considered by some analysts to be a direct competitor to
MPC. However, as with PG&E (the other company considered to be a direct competitor
of MPC), the competition would be akin to a David and Goliath match. Edison is over 9
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times the size o f MPC. Analysts may believe there is a competitor relationship because
o f MPC’s aggressive marketing program in Edison’s backyard.
Edison could decide that MPC would make sense to acquire for any or all of the
following reasons: MPC is developing a successfiil marketing program for California;
MPC has expertise in new growth areas, such as telecommunications, which may appeal
to Edison’s desire to fiirther diversify; MPC is recognized as a top competitor of
Edison; MPC, like Edison, has chosen to sell off its generating assets, concentrating in
energy services/trading and new technologies; MPC will have available cash from the
sale of its generating assets, which could be used to lower Edison’s debt position.

IV. Conclusion
As it has for many utilities across the nation, the issuance of FERC Order No. 888 has
caused the most dramatic changes ever made at the Montana Power Company. To let go
o f the traditional reliance on guaranteed rate recovery and launch into opening up the
company’s electric customer base to competition, as well as diving into energy trading
and marketing in states far away, has been a giant step for MFC.
But even more dramatic was the company’s decision to sell its generating assets. As
mentioned earlier. Bob Gannon has seen the future of electric deregulation for the
vertically-integrated MFC. It encompasses price volatility and low prices, especially in
electric generation. Gannon believed MFC could not withstand the tens of millions of
dollars of losses it would undoubtedly incur before prices stabilized in the marketplace
and the company’s stranded cost issues with the MFSC were resolved. So the company
decided to sell its generating assets and change its focus, concentrating on electric
distribution, oil and gas production, energy trading and telecommunications.
Unfortunately, the sale price will be adversely effected by the failure to form a regional
transmission grid (IndeGO), which would have eliminated the “pancaking” of
transmission prices between Montana generating stations and major West Coast
markets.
MFC’s strategic direction is not significantly different than the hypothesis of this paper,
which stated that MFC would be unable to continue as a vertically-integrated utility,
because of the new demands for efficiency in the deregulated marketplace. It was
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believed (in the hypothesis) that MPC was not large enough to compete effectively, nor
did it have an adequate customer base to hold onto its position in the Montana
electricity market. Therefore, the conclusion of the hypothesis was that MFC would
have to merge with another Northwest utility in order to survive in the deregulated
world. While it is still very possible and viable for MFC to merge with another
Northwest utility, the merger would happen for different reasons than anticipated at the
start of this study.
By selling off its generating assets, MFC has effectively nullified the need to survive by
merging with another utility. By removing the need to achieve a balance between
MFC’s large, diverse resource base and a market with a large number of customers,
MFC has given itself some breathing room to assess the future from a strategic (rather
than survival) viewpoint. MFC will become a buyer of electricity in the open market, a
strategic direction taken by several of the companies evaluated, such as Pacific Gas &
Electric and Edison International.
In addition, the sale will generate a large amount of cash for MFC’s energy trading and
telecommunication businesses and will remove the need for a long, drawn-out battle
with the MFSC over stranded cost recovery. This will help position the company in the
areas it has chosen to compete in, such as energy trading and the bundling of energy
services in California.
As mentioned briefly above, MFC may still chose to merge with another utility, even
though the risks posed by deregulation will be minimized by the sale of its generating
assets. A compelling reason for merger in today’s deregulated world may be to
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capitalize on combined strengths, minimize weaknesses and develop strategic alliances
in the marketplace. For the first time, company’s can look at how their consolidated
efforts can improve services, advance technological breakthroughs and reach markets
previously inaccessible to traditional utilities.
For these reasons, MPC should look closely at a merger with Puget Sound Energy
Puget and MPC have dealt with each other for many years, through the joint ownership
o f the Colstrip plants. Although the relationship has been strained at times, with court
battles and binding arbitration over a variety o f issues, the two management teams know
each other and are familiar with each other’s company cultures. The recent settlement of
several long-standing disputes between the two companies should allow for a more
cordial relationship.
Further, the strategic direction of the two companies would blend well. Puget has
become the largest gas utility in the Pacific Northwest, with the acquisition of
Washington Natural Gas MPC has stated that it intends to stay in the oil and gas
business, where it has over 40 years of expertise in oil and gas operations, in both the
U.S. and Canada (where Puget has gas properties). Puget could draw on MPC’s
expertise and could conceivably utilize MPC’s gas storage facilities and production for
some seasonal load balancing and spot market opportunities.
Both companies are focusing on development of high value services, such as automated
meter-based data retrieval and geographic information systems. With MPC’s expertise
in automated dam monitoring equipment, as developed by its subsidiary Tetragenics,
and the company’s telecommunications experience, a joint effort between MPC and
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Puget could potentially achieve more in technological advancement than either
company could do alone.
The recent agreement between Puget and Duke Energy Trading, where the two
companies have agreed to coordinate energy marketing and trading activities in 14
western states and British Columbia, would enable MPC to market energy much more
effectively than its current stand alone, relatively young trading floor. The expertise
gained by an association with a large trading company (such as Duke), would help
insure MPC’s survival in this new, cutthroat arena.
Consolidation of administrative functions would create savings almost immediately for
the merged company, although it would require some time to blend the two corporate
cultures. With Puget being about half again as large as MPC, in terms of revenue and
assets, it’s assumed the corporate headquarters would reside at Puget’s offices in
Bellevue, Washington.
Finally, and probably most important from a strategic viewpoint, is MPC’s fiber optic
reach into the Seattle area. Puget’s large customer base would provide MPC’s Touch
America with access to a large West Coast market that it currently does not have viable
access to. With Touch America’s proven track record of high quality customer service
at a low price, this market development could prove significant for both companies.
In summary, MPC has begun the steps to survive in a deregulated world, by undoing its
vertical integration. The next step, to insure the company’s survival, may be to merge
with Puget Sound Energy. The hypothesis stated that MPC would need to merge or
acquire another Northwest utility in order to compete (or even survive) after
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deregulation. While the path may vary slightly with the sale of MPC’s generating
assets, the outcome MFC should be heading toward confirms this hypothesis. Merging
with Puget would make the most sense for the future o f the Montana Power Company

Exhibits

122

Exhibit 1 P a g e 1 of 2

Exhibit _ (PRC-08)
1995 Test Period Revenues

123

Exhibit 1 P a g e 2 o f 2
n t M3NTMM RMCR (XH>mt
CLCCTRIC UTILITY
OPTIONAL PILINQ OULCS RCVCMJES AT CUVtCNT MSC fWTES
a m W Y TOTALS
TEST PERIOD O C O OCCD«CR IM S

(A)
2

(* )
TOTAL

3
4

5
«
7
a
4

BESIOCNTIAL
GtTCRAL SERVICE * 1
GENERAL SERVICE - 2
IRRIGATION
LICKTINÎ SERVICE

121.A04.916
151.S34.3AS
8B,(U0,C44
4.909,344
9.167.395

11

SUBTOTAL RATE SCTCDAES

375,066,647

12
n

/YOniZATIOfC

0

15
16

INBILI m

0

17

TOTAL RATE SCHEDULES

375,066,647

MISSION VALLEY PCVCfl

1,343.161

10

14

IS
14
20
21
22

fitC RESALE

17,201,350

2J
24

CUT-Of-STATE SALES

44,907.573

MTSCELLATCOUB

10,377,046

25

X
27
28
29
30

TOTAL SYSTEM EXCUJDING Y7f
YELLCVSTCK NATKNAL PARK

440,975,777
2,007,225

31
32

TOTAL SYSTEM

451,063,002

124

A

Graph 3
Net Hydro & Thermal Out-Of-Market Cost
Total H&T + Trans C ost
$59M Net Out-Of-Market

.2 100

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

IZD NetH& T Frozen Cost [ E S a H & T Trans C Z Z O R e v e n u e Credit ■ ■ ■ A c t Credit - - M --H& T Mkt Value

K>

Exhibit
with MPC’s power-supply. Leaving early does not authorize a reduction in a
customer’s CTC-SC obligation because of their choice. All customers must be
held accountable for their share of the CTC-SC.

CTC-SC Risk
Q.

Is it appropriate to say that retail customers will pay for 100 percent of the
CTC-SC and MPC will pay 0 percent during the transition period?

A.

No, because the statement implies certainty. The statement will be true only if the
power-supply costs and market forecast used in the CTC-SC calculation turn out
exactly as predicted. If the actual market prices are lower or the resource costs are
higher than forecast, the CTC-SC will under collect out-of-market costs.
Likewise, the CTC-SC will over collect the out-of-market costs if the maricet price
is higher or the resource costs are lower than forecast After the transition period,
MPC’s power-supply will be sold at market prices without protection to MPC
investors.

Q.

Do you have an example of the CTC-SC dollar risk for the three market
price forecasts?

Graph 11
Hydro & Thermal Costs vs. Market Value
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Exhibit

Comparison of MPC rates (as represented by Missoula) with other selected rates (by city)
Type of Service*
City
Missoula, Montana (MPC)
Boise, Idaho
Spokane, Washington
Bellevue, Washington
Portland, Oregon
San Francisco, Calif.
Long Beach, Calif.
San Diego, Calif.
Reno, Nevada
Phoenix, Arzonia
Denver, Colorado

K)
V
O

RmrAime
;:
Missoula, Montana (MPC)
Boise, Idaho
Spokane, Washington
Bellevue, Washington
Portland, Oregon
San Francisco, Calif.
Long Beach, Calif.
San Diego, Calif.
Reno, Nevada
Phoenix, Arzonia
Denver, Colorado

‘

Residential Small Commercial Large Commercial
60.19 $
142.00 $
7,482.00
$
49.60 $
89.00 $
5,162.00
$
103.00 $
46.53 $
7,725.00
$
55.58 $
101.00 $
8,848.00
$
56.54 $
99.00 $
7,615.00
$
231.00 $
18,537.00
$ 127.18 $
191.00 $
22,205.00
$ 136.33 $
182.00 $
19,577.00
$ 121.21 $
87.93 $
135.00 $
10,992.00
$
98.69 $
193.00 $
12,651.00
$
72.35 $
104.00 $
$
9,416.00
5
2
1
3
4
10
11
9
7
8
6

7
1
4
3
2
11
9
8
6
10
5

' Residential rales = monthly cost for 1,000 kWh energy
Small Commercial = monthly cost for 12kW demand and 1,500 kWh energy
Large Commercial = monthly cost for 500 W/Vdemand and 150,000 kWh energy
Small Industrial = monthly cost for 1,000 kW demand and 400,000 kWh energy
Large Industrial = monthly cost for 5,000 kW demand and 2,500,000 kWh energy

2
1
4
5
3
9
11
10
7
8
6

Small Industrial
$ 17,566.00
$ 11,039.00
$ 19,195.00
$ 18,321.00
$ 17,592.00
$ 41,622.00
$ 49,032.00
$ 44,070.00
$ 27,427.00
$ 28,799.00
$ 20,785.00
2
1
5
4
3
9
11
10
7
8
6

Large Industrial
97,051.00
$
64,308.00
$
84,517.00
$
95,690.00
$
$ 103,125.00
$ 195,288.00
$ 272,018.00
$ 222,454.00
$ 155,407.00
$ 142,218.00
$ 111,813.00
4
1
2
3
5
9
11
10
8
7
6
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Sheet No. 99.9
Sheet No. 99.9

^

Schedule No. DMA-1
DIRECT MARKET ACCESS SERVICE
A p p lic a h ilifv Applicable to Customers electing to purchase supply from Registered Power Suppliers for the
period July 1 .1998 through June 30.2002. subject to the following transition schedule:

July 1.1998 to June 30. 2000
Residential Rate Class
Residential Customer Choice Program limited to 3.000 Residential customers (100% of individual
loads).
General Service Primary & Secondary (GS-1). Imeation Rate Classes
Commercial Customer Choice Program limited up to 1.000 GS-1 and Irrigation Customers (100% of
individual loads) but not to exceed 56.000.000 kWh(s) per year.
General Service Substation & Transmission (GS-2)
One-third (l/3rd) of each customer's total load factored power supply loads, in MWh, as reflected in
Ae Utility's 1995 Test Period in Docket No. 96.____
July 1. 2000 to June 30. 2002
Residential Rat<> C la«
Residential Customer Choice Program Ihnited to 25,000 Residential customers (100% of individual
loads).
GS-1. Inigarinn Ran» Çla<w
Conunercial Customer Choice Program limited up to 5,000 GS-1 and Irrigation Customers (100% of
individual loads) but not to exceed 280,000.000 kWh(s) per year.
G S-2
Two-thirds (2/3rds) of each customer's total load factored power supply loads, in MWh, as reflected
in Ae Utility's 1995 Test Period in Docket No. 96.____
July 1.2002

Full power supply choice for retail sales.
RATES:

Net Monthly Bill:

ACCCTS RaK:
S tand ard R ate S c h e d u le

R-1
GS-1
GS-2
IS-1
L-1

AllkW h®
AlIkWh@
AU kWh @
AU kWh @
AU kWh @

$0.02688
$0.02035
$0.00340
$0.02601
$0.14293

Plus:
Transmission Service & Ancillary Services
Billing for Transmission Service and for Ancillary Services provided hereunder shall be in
accordance wiA the provisions of the Montana Power Company - Services Division's (Utility)
Open Access Transmission Tariff, on file with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
______________________________________________ (continued)_______________________________________
ISSUED BY; Perry J . Cole
TTTLE; Vice P resident_______
TARIFF LETTER NO.; _________________________ EFFECTIVE:
APPROVED;______________________________
Public Service C o m m issio n ol M o n ta n a
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f
The M ontana Pow er Com pany

—

------------------------------------------- --

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

MTP Q u a r ter ®

EMA<20>:iM*3

34

31

28

25

H IM I T

n T r r r r fl

22

Volume —
1 4 .8

J S D 9 4 J S

D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J

Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books

132

$

S D 9 8 J

1 1 .4

*

8.0

°

4 .6

c—

1.2

8
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PacifiC orp

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

PPU Q u arter

Volume —
5 4 .5
4 2 .0
2 9 .4

°

1 6 .9

-

4 .4
J S D 9 4 J S D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J

S L 9 8 J

Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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M
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Puget Sound Pow er & Light Com pany

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

28

IiflD in

4f t

25

22

19

Volume —

1 3 .6

ip.
J S D 9 4 J S D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J

Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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S D 9 8 J

1 0 .5

*

7 .4

-

4.2

E

1. 1

c
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Idaho Pow er Company

Five Y ear Stock Perform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

IDA Q u a r ter ■

-

33

30

27

24
Volume —

4 .3

Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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M
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The W ashington W ater Pow er Com pany

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

WJP Q u a r ter * # ::C^EMA<20)

Volume “ ■
7. 4

lliiillillllllllllll.
J S D 9 4 J S D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J

S D 9 8 J

Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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4. 0

-
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

PCC Q u a r t tf r ® , ;-.

35

32

I

29

ii 1iUlL

26

B ■ 1■ B B B

23

Vo I ume ■“

8 8 .3

I

137

68 .0

*

4 7 .7

-

...

1

7 .1
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Edison International

Five Y ear Stock P erform ance & Volume

(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)

EIX Q u a r t e r * rv EM A<2Q):9iie^^

Volume —
8 1 .2

I

lllllililllllllllii

J S D 9 4 J S D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J

138

S D 9 8 J

6 2 .5

w

4 3 .9

2

2 5 .2

^

6 .5

8

M o n ta n a P ow er Co*

MTP

— *—

Symbol: MTP

Five-Year Total Return

I

OJ W «st. U.S. Ele. Util.

. I DJ Equity M arket Index

(cumulaUve, roonUity Uirough Ju*e 26, 1996)

vD

(3.36)

115 7

------------

16.51

----------

585 6

58 5 6

22.05

22X15

29.38

29.38

'

35.35

44.51

2021

72.96

31.51

82.07 f

12.73

46.63

7.96

179.37

22.81

(2.91)
11.13

83.19

0.30
0.30

----------

’

A ll figures in percent.
V'-;"
Tot&l Return: A ll cash distributions and capital changes are taken into consideration in the
Cash distributions are considered leinrested as o f ih e Ex-dividend date.
'

Source: IDD Information Services

2.79
16.51

§

&

CO

of total return.

a

P acificorp

-

Symbol: PPW

Five-Year Total Return

]

PPW
DJ W est U S Ele. Util
DJ Equity M arket Index

(cumubthre, monthly through Jun« 26, 1996)

m

o

(7.05)
(16.48)
(17.63)
5.37
12.30
55.86

----------5.37
5.97
928

(326)
0.30
0.30
22.05
44.51
46.63

------22.05
20.21
7.96

2.79
16.51
16.51
29.38
72.96
179.37

---------29.38
31.51
22.81

<o

A ll figures in percent.
T(Aa1 Return: A ll cAsh distributions and capital changes are talccn into consideration in the calculation of total return.
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.'

Source: DDD Information Ser\dces

%

P u g e t S o u n d E n ergy Inc.
Symbol: PSD

—
— —

Five-Year Total Return

PSD
DJ W est. U S. Ele. Util
< DJ Equity M arket Index

(cttinubthre, monthty tttrough June 26, 19f ^

196%

147

1994

1993

1995

1996

1997

1998

II

s
0

(2.46)
(7.57)
(9.10)
770
29.94
3959

----------770
13.99
6.90

(3.36)
0.30
0.30
22.05
44.51
46.63

---------22.05
2021
7.96

2.79
16.51
16.51
29.38
72.96
179.37

---------29.38
31.51
22.81

cr
to

A ll ûguxes in percent.
Tctml Return: A ll c&sb. diitiibuti<ms and capxt&l change* are tmken into considexation in the r a tm i.tim of total return.
Ca5h dirtnbution* are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.
"

Source: EDD Information Services

w

5.

N

Id a h o P ow er Co.

— —

Symbol: IDA

Five-Year Total Return

IDA
DJ Ctl. U.S. Ele Util.
DJ Equity M arket Index

(cum ubtlve, monthly Utrongh Jtin« 26, 1996)

195%
156
117
78
39

4:^)
K

1993

1994

1996

1995

(5.72)
(3.19)
(5.92) '
17.81
29 JO
55.01

-----------17.81
13.89
9.16

(3.37)
1.82
1.82
27.39
36.16
63.60

------27.39
16.69
10.35

1997

1998

2.79
16.51
16.51
29.38
72.96
179.37

---------29.38
31.51
22.81

A ll figures in percent.
Total Return: All cash, distributions end capital changes are taken into oonsideiation in the calculation of total return.
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.

Source: IDD Information Services

m

cr

CO

•h .

o

f

W a sh in g to n W ater P ow er Co.
Symbol: WWP

— —

Five-Year Total Return

J

WWP
DJ W est U S Ele Util
DJ Equity M arket Index

(cumiii3tUve,monUily ttirough J u a « 26, 15>9S>

■
UU
)

(6.39) '
(4.63) ,
(5.12)
25.97
3820
60.62

---25.97
17.56
9.94

.

(326) '
0.30
0.30
22.05
44.51
46.63

---------22 A5
2021
7.96

2.79
16.51
16.51
29.38
72.96
179.37

---------29.38
31.51
22.81

A ll figures in percent.
Tot&l Return: A ll cash distributions and capital changes are taken into consideration in the calculation of total return.
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.

m
5*
X

O'

<c

Source: IDD Information Services

Ol
§.

Pg&E Corp.

PCG
— —

Symbol: PCG

Five-Year Total Return

J

DJ W est. U.S. Ele. Util.
DJ Equity M arket Index

(cttjnttktthre, monUily Uirough June 26, 1990)

192%

144

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

179.37

<o

A il figure* in percent.
Total Return: A ll cash distributions end capital changes are taken into consideration in the calculation of total return.
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as o f the Ex-dividend date.

Source; IDD Iiifonnatioii Services

0»
9,
N

E d iso n In te r n a tio n a l
Symbol: EIX

— —

Five-Year Total Return

EIX
DJ W est. U.S. Ele. Uiil.
' I DJ Equity M arket Index

(cwnubUve, monU»^ through June 2 6 ,1 9 # ^
172%

j:».

0.05
1124
9.47
2257
8959
5773

-----------2257
37.80
954

(336) ^
0.30
0.30
22.05
44.51
46.63

---------2235
2021
7.96

S>

2.79 •
16.51
16.51
29.38
72.96
179.37

---------29.38
31.51
22.81

A il rigures in percent.
Total Retuzn: A ll cash distributions and capital changes axe taken into consideration in the calculation of total xetuxn.
Cash distnbutions are consideied reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.

(D

Source: IDD Information Services

N
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Statement of Income
($ Millions, excepf per share amount)
1997
Operating Revenues
Expenses;
Operations & Maintenance
Administrative & General (where information was provided)
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization
Taxes Other Than Income
Special Charges
Total Expenses

4^

On

$

Montana Power Co.
1995
1996

1,024 $

1997

PaciflCorp
1996

1995

973 $

953

$

6,278 $

3.804

$

2,807

450
113
86
88

488
104
85
90
74
841

$
$
$
$
$
$

4,394
335
477
100
170
5,476

$
$
$
S

1,949
245
424
99

$
$
$
$

1,292
187
334
104

$

2,717 $

1,917

1,087 $

890

$
$
$
$

492
124
95
96

$

607 $

$
$
$
$
$
737 $

Income from Operations

$

217 $

236 $

112

$

802 $

Interest Expense/Other

$

26 $

44 $

33

$

468 $

420

$

297

Income from Continuing Operations (t>efore income taxes)

$

$

192 $

79

$

334 8

667

$

593

Income Tax Expense

$

62 $

72 $

22

$

110 $

236 $

192

Income from Continuing Operations

$

129 $

120 $

57

$

224 $

431

$

401

Discontinued Operations

$

*

-

-

$

438 $

75 $

103

Net Income

$

129 $

120 $

57

$

662 $

506 $

504

Preferred Dividends

$

4 $

8 $

7

$

23 $

30 $

39

Net Income Available for Common

$

125 $

112 $

50

$

639 $

476 $

465

EPS-Common Stock

$

2.29 %

2.03 $

0.92

$

2.16 $

1.62

1.64

191

$
$
$
$

%

$

$

Statement of Income
($ Millions, except per share amount)
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Puget Sound Energy
1995
1997
1996

Operating Revenues

Idaho Power
1996

1997

1995

1,631

$

749 $

578 $

546

949
29
141
151

$
$
$
$

333
138
72
21

168
133
70
21

$

154
127
67
23

1,270

$

564 $

392 $

371

$

361

$

185 $

186 $

175

$

117 $

142

$

$

44 $

41

173 $

275 $

219

$

139 %

142 $

134

$

107 $

92

$

46 $

52 $

48

$

93 $

90 $

86

$

1,677 $

1,649 $

$
$
$

1,015
21
162
160
56
1,414

$
$
$
$

920
32
144
156
5
1,257

$
$
$
$
$
$

263 $

392

Expenses;
Operations & Maintenance
Administrative & General (where information was provided)
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization
Taxes Other Than Income
Special Charges
Total Expenses

$

Income from Operations

$

Interest Expense/Other

$

Income from Continuing Operations (tiefore income taxes)

$

Income Tax Expense

$

Income from Continuing Operations

$

125 $

168 $

127

Discontinued Operations

$

(3) $

(2) $

(27)

Net Income

$

122 $

166 $

100

$

93 $

90 8

86

Preferred Dividends

$

17 $

$

22

$

5 $

7 8

8

Net Income Available for Common

$

105 $

144 $

78

$

88 $

EPS-Common Stock

$

1.25 %

1.70 $

0.94

8

$

$

90

48

$

$

22

46

$
$
$
$

$

2.32

$

-

$
$

$

$

-

83

8

78

2.21

8

2.10

Statement of Income
($ MiHions, except per shere amount)
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PG&E

WWP
1997
Operating Revenues
Expenses:
Operations & Maintenance
Administrative & General (where information was provided)
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization
Taxes Other Than Income
Special Charges
Total Expenses

00

$
$
$
$
$

1996

1.302 $
896
97
70
50

$
$
$
$

1997

1995

1996

1995

945 $

755

$

15,400 $

9,610 $

9,622

560
77
72
49

388
62
68
47

$

11,783 $

6,492

$

5,499

$

1,889 $

1,222

$

1,360

$
$
$
%

$

1.113 $

758 $

565

$ 13,672 $

7,714 %

6,859

Income from Operations

$

189 $

187 $

190

$

1,728 $

1,896 $

2,763

Interest Expense/Other

$

14 $

54 $

50

$

464 $

645 $

599

Income from Continuing Operations (before Income taxes)

$

175 $

133 $

140

$

1.264 $

Income Tax Expense

$

$

50 $

53

$

Income from Continuing Operations

$

114 $

83 $

87

Discontinued Operations

$

■-

Net Income

$

114 $

Preferred Dividends

$

Net Income Available for Common
EPS-Common Stock

61

$

1,251

$

2,164

548 %

555 $

895

$

716 $

696

1

1,269

-

$

-

-

%

-

$

-

83

$

87

$

716 %

696 $

5 $

8 $

9

$

-

-

$

109 $

75 $

78

$

716 $

696 $

1,269

$

1.96 $

1.35 $

1.41

$

1.75 $

1.75 $

2.99

%

$

$

1,269
-

statement of Income
($ Millions, except per share amount)

Exhibit 10 P a g e 4 o f 4
Edison International

1997

1995

1996

Operating Revenues

$

9,235 $

8,545 $

8,405

Expenses:
Operations & Maintenance
Administrative & General (wtiere information was provided)
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization
Taxes Other Than Income
Special Charges
Total Expenses

$
$
$
$
$
$

5,704
1,362
134
56
7,256

5.134
1,173
197
86
6,592

$
$
$
$
$
$

5,276
1,014
210
45
6.545

Income from Operations

$

1,979 $

1,953 $

1,860

Interest Expense/Other

$

742 $

673 $

593

Income from Continuing Operations (before income taxes)

$

1,237 %

1,280 $

1,267

Income Tax Expense

$

537

$

563 $

528

Income from Continuing Operations

$

700 $

717 $

739

$

700 $

717 $

739

Net Income Available for Common

$

700 $

717 $

739

EPS-Common Stock

$

1.75 9

1.64 $

1.66

$
$
$
$
$
$

Discontinued Operations
Net Income
Preferred Dividends
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Balance Sheet
($ Millions)
Montana Power Co.
1997

PaciflCorp

1996

1997

1996

Assets
C urrent A ssets
C a sh & C a sh Equivalents
Short-term Investm ents
A ccounts R eceivable
Net A ssets of D iscontinued O perations
Inventories & P rep ay m en ts
O ther Current A ssets
Total C urrent A ssets
Property, Plant & E quipm ent
A ccum ulated D epreciation
Net Property, Plant & Equipm ent
O ther N on-current A sse ts
Total N on-current A ssets
Total A ssets
L iab ilities a n d E q u ity
C urrent Liabilities
Short-term borrowings
C urrent portion of Long-term debt
A ccounts P ayable
Accrued T axes
O ther current liabilities
Total C urrent Liabilities
Long-term debt
Deferred Incom e T axes
D eferred Tax C redits
O ther Non-current Liabilities
Total N on-current Liabilities
Stockholder Equity
Preferred S tock
Com m on Stock
R etained E arnings
Total S tockholder Equity
Total Liabilities & Stockholder Equity

$

$

17
127

$
$

741

142

$

$
$
$
$
$

88
11
273
2,903
961
1,942
483
2,425

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

920
272
194

$

$

32

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

89
11
244
2,997
946
2,051
506
2,557

$

2.801

$

2,698

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

134
82
115
52
35
418
653
340
35

$
$

105
69
97
53
41
365
633
333

$

$
$

-

$
$

$
$

8
-

2,182
13,313
4 ,242
9,070
2 ,628
11,698

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

621
780
181
72
1,662
13,130
3,862
9,267
2,883
12,150

$

13,880

$

13,812

189
366
631
701
219
2,106
4,415
1,676
135
646
6,872

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

684
478
291
84
1,755
4,829
1,801
143
728
7,502

55

1,250

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

229
1,239

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$

123
695
315
1,133

$
$
$
$

123
692
279
1,094

$
$
$
$

582
3,274
1,047
4,903

$
$
$
$

523
3,237
796
4,556

$

2,801

$

2,698

$ 13,880

$

13.812

$

150

222

$

44

220
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Balance Sheet
($ Millions)
1997

Id a h o P o w e r
1997
1996

1996

Assets
C u rren t A s se ts
C a s h & C a sh E quivalents
S ho rt-term in v e stm e n ts
A cco u n ts R eceiv ab le
Net A s s e ts of D iscontinued O p e ra tio n s
In ventories & P re p a y m e n ts
O th er C urrent A sse ts
T otal C urren t A sse ts
P roperty, P lan t & E q u ip m en t
A ccu m u lated D epreciation
N et Property, P lan t & E q u ip m en t
O th er N on-current A s s e ts
T otal N on-current A s se ts
T otal A sse ts

$

8

$

4

$

7

$

8

$

158

$

159

$

123

$

51

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

59
123
348
5,144
1,613
3,531
615
4 ,1 4 6

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

72
142
377
4 ,8 9 0
1,493
3,397
4 53
3 ,8 5 0

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

54
33
217
2,711
942
1,769
420
2 ,1 8 9

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

57
28
144
2,619
887
1,732
420
2 ,152

$

4.494

$

4 ,2 2 7

$

2 ,4 0 6

$

2.2 9 6

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

373
51
117
74
76
691
1,412
629
130

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

298
100
96
57
149
700
1,166
587
94

$

2,171

$

1,847

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

58
30
112
24
35
259
704
4 24
70
131
1,329

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

36
17
33
140
739
412
71
132
1,354

$
$
$
$

273
1,312
47
1,632

$
$
$
$

303
1,292
85
1,680

$
$
$
$

107
452
259
818

$
$
$
$

107
452
243
802

$

4 ,4 9 4

$

4,227

$

2,4 0 6

$

2.2 9 6

Liabilities and Equity
C urrent Liabilities
S h o rt-term borrow ings
C urrent portion of L ong-term d e b t
A cco u n ts P a y a b le
A ccru ed T a x e s
O th er cu rren t liabilities
T otal C urrent Liabilities
Long-term d e b t
D eferred In co m e T a x e s
D eferred T ax C redits
O th er N on-current Liabilities
Total N on-current Liabilities
S to ck h o ld er Equity
P referred S tock
C o m m on S to ck
R etain ed E arn in g s
Total S to ck h o ld er Equity
Total Liabilities & S to c k h o ld e r Equity

151

54
-
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Balance Sheet
($ Millions)
WWP
1997

PG&E
1996

1997

1996

Assets
C u rren t A s s e ts
C a s h & C a s h E q u iv alen ts
S h o rt-term In v e stm e n ts
A c c o u n ts R ece iv a b le
N et A s s e ts of D isco n tin u ed O p e ra tio n s
Inven to ries & P re p a y m e n ts
O th er C u rren t A s s e ts
T otal C u rren t A sse ts
P roperty, P lan t & E q u ip m en t
A ccu m u lated D epreciation
N et P roperty. P lan t & E q u ip m e n t
O th er N o n -cu rren t A s s e ts
T otal N on-current A s s e ts
T otal A s s e ts
L ia b ilitie s a n d E quity
C u rren t Liabilities
S ho rt-term borrow ings
C urrent portion of L ong-term d e b t
A cco u n ts P a y a b le
A ccrued T a x e s
O th er cu rre n t liabilities
T otal C u rren t Liabilities
L ong-term d e b t
D eferred In co m e T a x e s
D eferred T ax C red its
O th er N on-current Liabilities
T otal N o n-current Liabilities
S to ck h o ld er Equity
P referred S to c k
C o m m o n S to c k
R etain ed E a rn in g s
T otal S to c k h o ld e r Equity
T otal Liabilities & S to c k h o ld e r Equity

$
$
$

31
23
177

$
$
$

8
20
149

$
$
$

237
1,160
3,002

$
$
$

131
13
1,983

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

70
76
377
2 ,2 7 6
635
1,641
394
2 ,0 3 5

$

52

626

$
$
$
$
$
$

5 ,025
36 ,5 1 3
16,041
2 0 ,4 7 2
5,060
2 5 ,5 3 2

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

584

229
2 ,1 4 0
592
1,548
401
1,949

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,711
33 ,3 1 0
1 4,302
19,008
4 ,5 1 8
2 3 ,5 2 6

$

2 ,4 1 2

$

2 ,1 7 8

$

3 0 ,5 5 7

$

2 6 ,2 3 7

103
784
2 ,1 3 2
226
739
3,984
10,435
4 ,0 2 9
339
2 ,0 3 4
16,837

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

681
210
1,426
310
653
3 ,2 8 0
7 ,7 7 0
3,941
380
1,663
13,754

-

-

154
36
149
339
762
353
17
36
1,168

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

95
37
71
203
7 65
313
43
28
1,149

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$

155
577
173
905

$
$
$
$

115
580
131
826

$
$
$
$

839
6 ,3 6 6
2,531
9 ,7 3 6

$
$
$
$

839
5,728
2 ,6 3 6
9 ,2 0 3

$

2 ,4 1 2

$

2 .1 7 8

$

30,5 5 7

$

2 6 ,2 3 7

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

152

-

-

Exhibit 11 P age 4 o f 4

Balance Sheet
($ Millions)

Edison Intl.
1997

1996

A ssets
Current A ssets
Cash & Cash Equivalents
Short-term investm ents
Accounts Receivable
Net A ssets of Discontinued Operations
Inventories & Prepaym ents
Other Current A ssets
Total Current A ssets
Property, Plant & Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation
Net Property, Plant & Equipment
Other Non-current A ssets
Total Non-current A ssets
Total A ssets

$

1,907

$

897

$

1,077

$

1,095

297
$
316
$
$ 3,597
$ 19,087
$ 4,970
$ 14,117
$ 7,387
$ 21,504

340
$
240
$
$ 2,572
$ 19,575
$ 4,302
$ 15,273
$ 6,714
$ 21,987

$ 25,101

$ 24,559

330
$
868
$
441
$
577
$
1,512
$
$ 3,728
$ 8,871
$ 4,085
351
$
$ 1,930
$ 15,237

397
$
592
$
438
$
530
$
$ 1,481
$ 3,438
$ 7,475
$ 4,283
372
$
$ 1,885
$ 14,015

Liabilities and Equity
Current Liabilities
Short-term borrowings
Current portion of Long-term debt
Accounts Payable
Accrued Taxes
Other current liabilities
Total Current Liabilities
Long-term debt
Deferred Income Taxes
Deferred Tax Credits
Other Non-current Liabilities
Total Non-current Liabilities
Stockholder Equity
Preferred Stock
Common Stock
Retained Eamings
Total Stockholder Equity

$
$
$
$

Total Liabilities & Stockholder Equity

153

609
2,351
3,176
6,136

$ 25,101

$
$
$
$

709
2,644
3,753
7,106

$ 24,559
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Price-to-Earninqs vs. Industry
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19.0
17.0
15.0
13.0
LA

11.0
9.0
7.0
5.0
O'

#
J*

.6^'
✓

►
— C om pany
— Industry

Exhibit 13

16.0%

Return on Equity vs. Industry

14.0%
12 .0 %
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Debt to Equity vs. Industry
1.9
1.7
1.5

LA
ON

0.9
0.7
0.5
P
Company
— — Industry

Residential biectric Service
Monthly Cost lot 1,000 kWh
As of July 1,1997

MISSOULA
$60.19
,EVIS/ON

$43*1

GRANDFORKS
$66.60 1
^APID CITY
$72.80

CASPER
$55.13
RENO
$87 93
I AN FRANCISCO
> $12718\

L
A
-J

lATI
SALT LAKE OITY
$70.85/
DENVER
$72.35

CHCAC
$112.7^
VICHITA
N.A.

G BEACH
,136.33

1.67

ISVU.LE
N.A.

ST.LOUl:
$92.15

RALEIGH
±87.52 ,

PHOENIX
$98.69
tUQUERQUE
$92.77

PITTSBURGI
$119.14

^JACKSC M
N.A.

ORLEAI

/O
HONOLULU
$127.21

J

Source: Idaho Power Company News Update, Internet retrieval

<n

Coiiifiieicml £ le c tn c Service
Month^ Cost (of 12 kW and 1,500 kW h
As of July 1,1997

MISSOULA
$142

GRAND FORK
$99
ST.PAU
$122

RAPID CITY

$168

S MOINES
$129

REMO

CHCA
$256

RANCIS

ITTS8URGH
$314

DENVER

LA

$104

00

VICHITA
NA

0UISV1LL
NA

ST LO
$143

RALEIGH

9

TULSA
$127

PHOENIX
SAN DIE'
$182

INONNATH
$179

ALBUQUERQUE
$155

ACKSON
N.A.
DALLAS
$152

NNAH
$168

§

WORLE

cn
HONOLULU
$221

«9
NJ

S.
Source: Idaho Power Company News Update, Internet retrieval

Medium Commercial Electric Service
Monthly Cost for 100 kW and 30.000 kWh
As olJuly 1.1997

5 ,^

SPOKANE
44.068 I

«■LAND

I

MISSOULA
$4,497

GRAND f o r k :

$5,187
ST.PAUI
$5.79V
RAPID CITY
$6,051

BOISE
$3,099
CASPE
$3.91
RENO
$6,721

PITTSBURGH

lES MOINES
$5,058

R

SALT LAME CITY
$5,320 j

SA NffRAN CtSto
S
$ 1 0 .1 0 ^

VICHITA

\o

$8,609

_
IINGTC

/
fILLE

NA

LA

CINNATI I
488

NA.

RALEIGH
N 4SL757

IG BEACH
J 0.960
ALBUQUERQUE
$8,370

JACK SON

N.A.

ORLEi

m
&
CT

/O
HONOLULU
$9,738

J

Source: Idaho Power Company News Update. Internet retrieval

Ol

Large Commerctal Electric Service
Monthly Cost fo» 500 kW and 150.000 kWh
As of July

BE
$$.84$/SPOKANE
$7.725
porrRAWD
7

MISSOULA
$7.482
VISION
6.882

1,1997

GRAND f o r k s
$8.825

ST. PA
$ 8.6

BOISE

RAPID CITY
$8.829

$5.162
CASPER
$6.382
RENO
$10.992
RANCIS&O
$18.537

g

$19.577

$ I f 642
DES MOINES
$8.341

ALT LAKE a t Y
$8.689
DENVER
$9.416

LONG BEACH
.205

SANDRO

OEIFIOIT

VICHITA
NA

PHOE
$12.65

PITTSBURG
CINCINNATI
CAGO I $10.807
$11.068

ASH
$17.65

ST. I
$14JK

LDWSV
N.A.
RALE

TULSA
$9.814
BUQUERQUE
$12.225

$13.462

JA( XSON

NL

DALLAS
$10,360

gCJ

HONOLULU
$16.189
$111,332

Ol

Source: Idaho Power Company News Update. Internet retrieval

o
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